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The Strange Career of the Defense Intellectuals

"Grenades From the Candy Store": British Defense Policy in the 1990s?

Profile: Hafiz al-Asad of Syria

Sudan: Old Wine in New Bottles

Summer 1987

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THE STRANGE CAREER OF THE DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS

by Roman Kolkowicz

Admiral Lewis Strauss, former head of the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1956 once witnessed a meeting at the Walter Reed Hospital, where, "gathered around a patient's bedside, and attentive to his last words of advice and wisdom were the Secretary of Defense, his deputies, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and all the military chiefs." The central figure in this striking tableau was "a young mathematician who but a few years before had come to the United States as an immigrant from Hungary." The patient was John Von Neumann, a defense intellectual par excellence. Admiral Strauss was moved to confess that he "never witnessed a more dramatic scene or a more moving tribute to a great intelligence."[1] This scene is particularly remarkable in light of the American Establishment's century-long tradition of anti-intellectualism and disdain for the non-pragmatic and "non-serious" intellectual outsiders. Postwar American society, however, saw the rise to power of a group of intellectuals whose theories and policies largely determined American nuclear strategy and whose activities continue to have broad implications for American defense policy.

American and Soviet Concepts of War

One of the most profound disparities between the Soviet and American approaches to military strategy is rooted in their fundamentally dissimilar approaches to the relationship between politics and war, that is, the uses of military power for political objectives. With regard to strategy, "most Americans are neo-Jominians and neo-Uptonians,"[2] while the Soviets follow the teachings of Clausewitz and his Marxist and Leninist followers.

Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, one of the most influential military strategists of the nineteenth century, maintained that the study and conduct of war is a science that can be reduced to fixed rules and mathematical formulas. He believed that while the technology and technique of war may change, its "principles are unchanging." His vision of the study of war as a science derived from the spirit of the Enlightenment.

[1] Cited in Steve J. Heims, *John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the Technologies of Life and Death* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980), p. 371.

[2] See Col. Harry G. Summer, Jr., "What is War?" *Harpers*, May 1984, pp. 75-78.

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Aspects of this tradition underlie many of the hopeful premises of crisis management and arms control in the nuclear era, and the vast literature on nuclear deterrence strategies. Two echoes are especially clear. The first can be seen in the post-World War II American fascination with the control and manipulation of levels of violence, with computer models and conflict scenarios, and with war as an almost bloodless game. These resulted in the development of nuclear war strategies which embodied, according to Walter Lippmann,[3]

> the perfect fulfillment of all wishful thinking on military matters; here is war that requires no national effort, no draft, no discipline, but only money and engineering know-how, of which we have plenty. Here is the panacea which enables us to be the greatest military power on earth — without investing time, energy, sweat, blood and tears.

Americans were forced to change these early attitudes to nuclear war; first by the loss of atomic monopoly, then the loss of nuclear superiority, and the descent into parity. Still, underlying beliefs have hardly changed. The desire for the effective punishment of an aggressor, for example, the "unambiguous and certain . . . disabling [of an] offender . . . with maximum ease, and at minimal cost" is as valid an objective today as it was forty years ago.

The second characteristic of American strategic thought has to do with the isolation of strategy from politics. In the tradition of General Emory Upton, who believed that "war and politics are diametrically and fundamentally different," Americans assume that war is the concern of military experts alone. As Michael Howard observes, "nuclear weapons have deepened this belief: too complex for the average citizen to comprehend, too awesome even to contemplate, war in the nuclear age has been perceived by many to be something done by 'experts.' "[4] The technological sophistication of nuclear weapons also encourages the American tendency to concentrate on the complexity of weapons at the expense of serious study of the adversary's interests, values and motives.

Soviet strategic thinking has different roots, deriving from the theories of Carl von Clausewitz and the Marxist neo-Clausewitzians, including Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. Widely read and admired by the Marxists and Bolsheviks, Clausewitz deeply influenced their thinking. Friedrich Engels, known as the "Red General," was probably the most sophisticated Marxist student of military affairs. Paraphrasing Clausewitz, he defined what later became the Soviet approach to war and strategy:

[3] Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 48.

[4] Michael Howard cited in Colonel Harry G. Summer, Jr., "What is War?" *Harpers*, May 1984, pp. 75-78.

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Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade, for however rarely it may be necessary for it actually to occur, everything is directed towards it, and *eventually it must take place all the same, and must be decisive.*[5]

War, in this conceptualization, is neither a scientific process nor an international sport, but a terrible and unpredictable act of violence. As Clausewitz observed, "we do not like to hear of generals who are victorious without the shedding of blood"[6] because this leads to an underestimation of the terrible nature of war and a false sense of control over events.

Soviet strategists scorn the so-called eternal principles of war, and instead stress the need to adapt strategy to actual conditions. Leon Trotsky, the founder of the Red Army, cited Clausewitz in arguing that "in practical military arts one should not drive the flowers and foliage of theory too high, one should rather keep them close to the soil of experience." Moreover, despite many claims to a science of war, Trotsky pointed out that "none of the 'national' doctrines of war offered, or could offer, any 'final truth' about war. Each school of thought merely reflected temporary conditions of national existence." He sneered at "the 'eternal truths' of military science," which, upon examination, are "not much more than a few logical axioms and Euclidean postulates."[7]

Soviet thinking is also influenced by Russian tradition, which stresses the horror of war. Tolstoy observed that "war is the most terrible thing in life, and we ought to understand that and not play at war. We ought to accept this terrible necessity sternly and seriously . . . let war be war, and not a game."[8]

Although Soviet strategists today reflect the Clausewitzian tradition, they are intensely aware of Western strategic thinking. Unlike Western strategists, so many of whom naively and ethnocentrically assume their adversary thinks as they do, many Soviet scholars have in recent decades focused their attention on the work of American think tanks and military researchers. Indeed, several research institutes devote their work to this issue. Thus, several Soviet press commentators took advantage of the occasion provided by the establishment of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States of America to stress the "great importance of the comprehensive and concrete study of the economies and politics of the United States of America." They saw this as a central concern for Soviet researchers

[5] Engels, cited in Edward Mead Earle, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), p. 158.

[6] Clausewitz cited in Earle, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 100.

[7] In Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 484.

[8] Cited in Robert Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957), p. 33.

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of strategic and international affairs "in whatever field they may be working."[9]

Yet Soviet research institutes have far less influence on defense and foreign policy making than do their American counterparts. While U.S. defense intellectuals had an overwhelming impact immediately after World War II and continue to have a major voice, the role of Soviet research institutes remains marginal. The party apparat and the military dominate Soviet defense policy making, and they guard this power jealously. Military professionals under the political guidance of the party leadership retain control over the development of strategy. In effect, the intellectuals are confined to public relations — serving as host institutions for visiting foreign VIPs — and to studies of the capitalists' defense systems.

Given that deterrence and mutual assured destruction require mutuality, interdependence, and equilibria, these dissimilarities between the United States and the Soviet Union have disturbing implications. While each country has immense quantities of data on the other's military technologies, economic capabilities, and weapons systems, both have fundamental difficulties in understanding each other's assumptions and goals.

Intellectuals and War: Historical Perspectives

From the earliest civilization, intellectuals have offered advice and legitimating ideologies to rulers. The scribe-intellectual played an influential role in Mesopotamia, where the ruler "needed not only the military power . . . but also the bureaucratic know-how . . . and equally important, the royal ideology that was nurtured and elaborated on by scholars and intellectuals who catered to his needs." The services offered by scribes gained them positions that "offered them not only economic security, but also the reward of special status," which in turn "fostered the development of the kind of abstract scholarship reaching into the purely abstract realm of mathematical astronomy."[10] The scribes' activities became essential for the proper functioning of the bureaucracies and of the military.

In *The Twilight of Authority*, Robert Nisbet states that from "at least the time of the ancient Greek Sophists, there has been a striking affinity in the West between war and its symbols, roles, and objectives, and a substantial part of the intellectual class."[11] He further asserts that "an interest in war and in the uses of war and of the military is

[9] N. N. Inozemtsev, "Why U.S. Area Studies Are Vital," cited in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, April 14, 1970. See also, William and Harriet Scott, "The Social Science Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1980; and Carl G. Jacobsen, "Soviet Think Tanks," *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, Fall 1977, pp. 140-52.

[10] Leo Oppenheim, "The Positions of the International in Mesopotamian Society," in *Daedalus*, Spring 1975, pp. 37-57.

[11] Robert Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 176.

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a vivid characteristic of the intellectual mind." Nisbet suggests several reasons for this. Crisis and war, he argues, not only "bring a relief from the tedium and fixity of routine and the monotony," but also are associated with important and desirable objectives — progress in the sciences, technology, and arts; community of men under stress and danger; and revolution, which "is allied psychologically to war."[12] He sees Western intellectuals attracted to crisis through history: "The desire to be close to the seat of power, to seek with every means to expand that power, to extend it over as wide a field, domestic and foreign alike, as possible, was as strong in the Rome of Augustus as in the Washington of Kennedy." Above all, there is an "intoxication in participation in great decisions."[13] Raymond Aron maintains that many intellectuals are drawn to war and revolution not because it promises to reconcile mankind or solve the riddle of history but because violence itself fascinates them.[14]

Intellectuals tend to support the secular and centralized state. According to Nisbet, "the state in the West has attracted to itself what can only be called a clerisy of power . . . a long succession of philosophers and intellectuals from Greek and Roman times to our own who have made the political state the temple, so to speak, of their devotion."[15]

This has something to do with the fact that the state originated in war and that its instruments evolved to maintain large military establishments. Max Weber saw the bureaucratization of society and the state as dictated largely by the needs "of a standing army and the development of finance associated with it." He concluded that the demands of "the disciplined modern army brought about the triumph of the modern state."[16] Edward Shils suggests that American intellectuals tend to believe "the state should do it." And although the dominant tradition of American intellectuals has been to distrust the regnant powers, it has also "been associated with a tradition which asserts that the ills of society can be cured by a strong and virtuous authority" since at least the 1880s. Shils concludes the root of this new tradition lie in the ideal of a strong state.[17]

Action Intellectuals

Probably the most significant involvement of intellectuals in affairs of state has come about in this century, when the growing needs of the authorities transformed "clerks" into "laymen" and "in-

[12] Ibid., pp. 154-74.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1957).
[15] Nisbet, *Twilight of Liberation*, pp. 205-6.
[16] W. G. Runciman, ed., *Weber: Selections in Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 348.
[17] Edward Shils, *The Intellectuals and the Powers* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 172.

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tellectuals" into "experts." The complexity of the modern affairs of state and war creates a demand for expertise, and thus for intellectuals to involve themselves. This has countered the American tradition of anti-intellectualism, the long-standing tendency of politicians, journalists, and populists of every kind to jeer at those who were "untainted with any practical experience ... amateurs, dreamers, theorists."[18]

The era between World War I and the Depression saw an influx of intellectuals into positions of authority, but this frail rapprochement barely survived World War I. Adolph Berle, who helped shape the New Deal, recalled that "a politician who talked to a professor in those days kept it a dark secret. We were freaks, like phrenologists."[19]

The intellectuals rose more firmly to power after World War II, when they were embraced by their traditional antagonists. For example, journals like *Fortune*, *Business Week*, and *Life* — voices of the business community and practical men of affairs — now perceived the intellectual in a radically new way. As *Business Week* put it in 1963:

> Today's great national security problems involve an interaction of scientific, technical, economic, and political factors. They demand a type of abstract thinking that is both disciplined and inspired, a type of thinking that has always been associated with a very unmilitary type of person. For lack of a better name, this sort of person usually is called an "intellectual." For many it has been a shock just how important the intellectuals have become — especially in a country that has always maintained at least a pose of anti-intellectualism since frontier days. The acceptance of responsibility has brought a no less dramatic change in the intellectuals themselves. Traditionally they have been outsiders, social critics, idealists. But now, they are insiders and forced to come to grips with reality.

Having proclaimed the intellectuals insiders, the establishment praised them lavishly. "The intellectuals who are now playing so important a role in national security seem a new breed. This breed has already made an important contribution to protecting the nation's security." At times it seemed that the very survival of our nation depended on these new Prometheans. "If we get through these nightmarish years with our free institutions intact — and our people alive — much of the credit will belong to them."[20] Wesley W. Posvar asserted in 1964 that "Rand appears to be one of the best investments the United States government has made since the Louisiana Purchase."[21]

In 1967, Theodore H. White, historian-laureate of the American establishment, wrote for *Life* that there is a "new power-system in

[18] See Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 219.

[19] In Theodore H. White, "Action Intellectuals," *Life*, June 9, 16, 23, 1967.

[20] "The Problem Solvers of National Security," *Business Week*, July 13, 1963.

[21] Wesley W. Posvar, "The Impact of National Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States," *Public Policy*, XIII, 1964, pp. 36-64.

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American life, a new priesthood unique to this country and this time, of American action-intellectuals. In the past decade, this brotherhood of scholars has become the most provocative and propelling influence on all American government and politics, and their ideas are shaping our defense and guiding our foreign policy." As the world outruns its comprehension of itself, "inherited knowledge and tradition no longer grip unto reality." Yet governments must have solutions to pressing policy problems, and therefore "with almost primitive faith the American government has turned to the priesthood of action-intellectuals," to those men who believe that "they can chart the future of our country." For these intellectuals, "now is the Golden Age, and America is the place."

For White and others, the defense intellectuals had a special place. Courted by politicians, the media, and business leaders, these intellectuals have in recent years "reshaped the basing and strike patterns that deploy SAC bombers around the globe; led to the great nuclear test ban treaty of 1963; reshaped our economy and . . . made us rich. In the next 10 years, their theories will change America even more."[22] White went on to observe: "The Academic Strategists have defined the problems of nuclear strategy and developed its vocabulary. They have fostered two revolutions in strategic thought (the limited war revolution and the vulnerability revolution) and they stand on the verge of a third."

The intellectuals articulated theories of nuclear war and international relations; they created deterrence, limited war, and arms control; they managed the defense establishment and scientific-military operations. Some among them, such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, even became celebrities.

How can one account for this new role and influence of the intellectual? The question resembles the one that Alexis de Tocqueville grappled with in studying the French Revolution.[23] Struck by the intellectuals' role, he asked how "men of letters, without wealth, social eminence, responsibilities or official status" almost alone could "speak with accents of authority?" His answer was threefold:

— First, they were almost without political experience and were consequently made the bolder in political prescription;
— Second, their very ignorance of, or disdain for, experience and history made them welcome . . . simple elementary axioms concocted by individual reason broadcast in seductive language made the intellectual class popular with certain men of money and power;
— Third, the corruption and considerable displacement of the old aristocracy in France left a vacuum.

[22] *Life*, ibid.
[23] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* cited in George Deltuszar, *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955) pp.17-18.

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American intellectuals after World War II resembled those of eighteenth-century France. They generally lacked political experience (most came from university faculties and research institutes, or from abroad) and this freed them to announce simple "elementary axioms concocted by individual reason." They then broadcast these in the "seductive language" of balance of terror, mutually assured destruction, counterforce/countervalue targeting doctrines, limited war, escalation dominance and control, deterrence by denial and so forth. In short, they developed a new science of war.

Their success was also made possible by an analogous displacement of the "old aristocracy" that had traditionally framed American military thought — military officers. It was the defense intellectuals who wrote the rules for the new game of victory by stalemate. As Bernard Brodie asserted at the very dawn of the nuclear era, "Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose."[24] Overwhelmed by exotic new weaponry, the strange logic of new strategic theories, and by unorthodox political demands, the military opted out. It was simply not prepared for permanent stalemate and "compromise" with a "deterred" enemy. The impact of nuclear technologies on the theory of war "put a premium on the special forte of the intellectuals — theoretical calculations." Because nuclear weapons raised new questions, they seemed to render military experience — the stock-in-trade of the generals and admirals — irrelevant, leading to a "bitter battle between pen and sword."

The intellectuals who joined the foreign and defense bureaucracies shared a professional interest in the problem of war and politics in the nuclear context. They generally believed that these problems lend themselves to systematic study and that predictable results can be obtained through the application of calibrated levels of threat and coercion. They rejected traditional solutions for political-military problems, preferring to approach policy objectives within a relatively value-free context. As Fritz Ermarth suggested, in the U.S. strategic culture, "when it comes to nuclear strategy, we do not believe much in 'real' nuclear war anyway." We are essentially concerned with devising theories and capabilities which are "adequate and persuasive in a peacetime setting."[25]

Most members of this new elite[26] having been trained in economics, mathematics or the social sciences, sought to "forget the past,

[24] Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76.

[25] Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," in D. Leebaert, ed., *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 64.

[26] The most influential and best known defense intellectuals were associated with the Rand Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Hudson Institute, the research institutes associated with Harvard University, Columbia University, and MIT, among others, as well as with the bureaucracies of the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. For

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return to first principles and attempt to build up a theory appropriate to the new age." The defense intellectuals provided policy recommendations determined largely by technology. Game theory provided "a means of reducing strategic problems to a manageable form in which the dilemmas and paradoxes of the age could be bared and solutions explored."[27] As a form of logical reasoning, game theory depends on subjectively determined premises; it can offer valuable insights into behavior. What it cannot do is predict how actors in the real world would respond to situations approximating those in the theoretical models, or even say how they ought to respond.

The defense intellectuals radically redefined strategy. They had an enormous impact in the United States on theories of war, on the uses of military force for political purposes, and on the techniques of joining economic means to given policy ends. They also brought in other new ideas: (1) Nuclear strategy as a science — nuclear war and its deterrence can be controlled by precise, quantifiable methods and policies involving the threat of force to affect the adversary's decision; (2) Nuclear war as an abstraction — nuclear war and deterrence strategies are best conducted with abstract concepts from game theory, economics and the replication of crisis scenarios; (3) Strategies of nuclear war and deterrence as apolitical and ahistorical concepts — only "hard," quantifiable variables of military capabilities, technological parameters, and economic resources are relevant. "Soft" variables such as historical patterns, cultural traditions, political practices and personality traits are irrelevant; (4) Nuclear war and strategy as a management problem — decision makers entrusted with national security must focus almost exclusively on the efficient application of available resources. War and strategy become a matter of finding the most efficient management of finite resources.

The deterrence paradigm, developed by the defense intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, provided the central methodological concept for the management of nuclear strategy. Several assumptions supported this key concept: nuclear war is not winnable since the cost in death and destruction would exceed likely gains; therefore, calculations by rational decision makers will lead to war-avoidance. War-avoidance therefore becomes the overriding objective, and nuclear weapons are needed to provide a credible deterrence posture.

The deterrence paradigm appears to be grounded in Adam Smith's economics, modified by Jeremy Bentham's notions of hedon-

discussion of the various relevant institutions and staff members, see Arthur Herzog, *The War-Peace Establishment* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), particularly chapter II, "The Analysts"; Paul Dickson, *Think Tanks* (New York: Atheneum, 1972), chapter VII; Saul Friedman, "The Rand Corporation and Our Policy Makers," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1963, pp. 61-68; Bruce L. Smith, *The Rand Corporation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); and Stephen Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

[27] See Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, chapter 12, "The Formal Strategists."

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istic utilitarianism, and influenced by strategies of mini-maxing — all adapted to the stark realities of nuclear weaponry and the balance of terror.[28] Like earlier inventors of the ideal "economic man," contemporary inventors of the perfectly rational "strategic man" make no effort to connect their abstract models to reality. Thorstein Veblen's observations on the classical economists apply remarkably well to the civilian strategists:

> This perfect competitive system, with its untainted economic man' is a feat of scientific imagination, and is not intended as a competent expression of fact. It is an expedient of abstract reasoning . . . but as happens in such cases, having once been accepted and assimilated as real it becomes an effective constituent in the inquirer's habit of thought and goes to shape his knowledge of facts. It comes to serve as a norm of substantiality or legitimacy.[29]

The "strategic man" becomes a "lightning calculator of pleasures and pain" who has "neither antecedent nor consequent," one who "oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire and of happiness under the impulse or stimuli," and who is an "isolated, definitive human datum in stable equilibrium."[30] Both the classical utilitarian economists and the modern deterrence theorists premised their theoretical systems on an unrealistic "doctrine of the harmony of interests" in a competitive and antagonistic system.

The political and military implications of this intellectual legacy are profoundly troubling. In defining the theories, methodologies, and rules for decision making, the intellectuals largely disregarded the Soviet approach.

Soviet-American Strategic Dissimilarities

Most of the differences between Soviet and American strategy "reflect dissimilarities between the Soviet and U.S. strategic cultures, not any inherent incapacity on one side or the other to appreciate military logic." If U.S. strategic concepts are "the artifacts of civilian decision makers who have set the drumbeat of U.S. national security over the years . . . in the Soviet case those responsible for formulating doctrine and strategy, setting R&D requirements, selecting weapons for deployment, and sizing the forces all wear uniforms."[31] The Soviets have shown little inclination to adopt the intellectual structures that have grounded U.S. defense planning over the past forty years.

Soviet and American policies are based on different assumptions regarding nuclear war. Both countries have embraced the concepts of limitation of damage should deterrence fail; and their military

[28] Max Lerner, "Editor's Introduction," in *The Portable Veblen* (New York: Viking, 1948).
[29] Ibid., p. 269.
[30] Ibid., p. 232.
[31] Benjamin Lambeth, "Contemporary Soviet Military Policy," Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Mickiewicz, eds. in *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 35.

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technologies are similar, but a wide gap separates the two states' perceptions of the relationship between politics and war.

Since the early 1960s, the overriding objective of U.S. policy has been "the development of a strategic posture designed to enable the United States to control any nuclear exchange in order to limit damage at the lowest possible levels while ensuring that the outcomes are favorable to the United States." The notion of controlled response, developed by the Kennedy administration in 1961-62, governed the design of SIOP 63 (the single integrated operational plan), which has been retained in modified versions ever since. Its objective is to control escalation and to give the Soviet Union every incentive not to attack major urban-industrial targets.

Soviet strategic thinking is markedly different. Soviet planners believe that the best approach to limiting damage to the Soviet Union is rapid and wholesale destruction of Western nuclear forces. The Soviet view of deterrence involves "neither the notion of assured destruction or unacceptable damage, nor that of limited or controlled nuclear options. Rather, deterrence of nuclear attacks is best achieved by the ability to wage a nuclear war successfully."[32] The better equipped Soviet forces are to fight a nuclear war, the more effective they will be in deterring an attack against them. Should deterrence fail, these forces would be used for military victory.

In other words, Soviet strategists approach nuclear war much as they approach all other forms of armed conflict, using Clausewitz's ideas as a base. They consistently reject the concept of mutual assured destruction as an abandonment of responsibility and argue that key political decisions in the West are often subordinated to narrow technological imperatives or to abstract notions of game theory. In answer, Western strategists point to the most influential postwar Soviet work on nuclear strategy, edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky,[33] and complain that "nowhere in this book, as in most Soviet literature as well, are there to be found signs of serious professional interests in concepts like controlled response and restrained nuclear targeting."[34]

In return, Soviet strategists ask how it can be possible "to set the rules of the game, say to agree not to bomb peaceful towns, to limit the power of the bombs to 10 kilotons, and use them in battlefield only, to ban all explosions except air bursts with no radioactive aftermath, etc."[35] Western concepts such as demonstration attacks, limited nuclear options, and slow-motion counterforce duels meet with bemusement, perplexity, and sarcasm in the Soviet Union. The

[32] Ibid.

[33] Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky, *Soviet Military Strategy*, eds. H. Dinerstein, L. Goure, and T. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963).

[34] Cited in R. Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Union: Elusive Adversary," in *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War*, p. 6.

[35] L. Feokistov, "Atomic Bomb As It Is," in *Peace and Disarmament: Academic Studies* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), p. 76.

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concepts appear questionable because they "rely on the chance that the aggressors will be prudent and will impose certain limits on the use of nuclear weapons."[36]

Noted Soviet strategist General N. Talensky has expressed unease with Western formulations: "When the security of the state is based on mutual deterrence with the aid of powerful nuclear missiles, it is directly dependent on the good will and designs of the other side, and that is a highly subjective and unreliable factor."[37] Soviet Defense Minister Grechko asserted that Western strategists "consider war as a mere armed clash between the two sides" and therefore "emasculate the political content of the concept of war."[38]

The Legacy of Defense Intellectuals

Defense intellectuals did improve policy making during a crucial period, expanding the universe of strategy and policy, and introducing an element of predictability. These experts systematized decision making in the complex nuclear system; they brought out certain crucial implications of the traditional attitudes toward war and strategy; and they created an impressive body of theory on strategy in the nuclear context.

But the legacy of the defense intellectuals is not entirely positive. This "priesthood of action intellectuals" saw the adversary as implacably hostile and imputed a view to him of politics as a zero-sum game. In this way, it promoted a very limited understanding of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The intellectuals' theorizing effectively depoliticized war and militarized politics, leading to an excessive abstraction of warfare and strategy. They fostered illusions of control over war and ill-founded claims of rationality by decision makers. Holding that nuclear issues are so esoteric that only specialists can cope, the intellectuals tended to discourage public discussion. Assuming that war in the nuclear context is "continuation of management by other means," they reduced the complexities of international politics to a matter of means-ends techniques. Over-abstraction, scientism, numerology, and technical jargon are all part of the legacy of this professionalism.

The golden age of the "action intellectuals" has passed. While civilian defense intellectuals enjoyed great success through the 1950s and 1960s, opposition to their theories grew steadily. The intractables of politics scuttled their elegant designs and authoritative doctrines. Military officers found their intellectual arrogance offensive. Many academics challenged their ahistorical and apolitical biases, warning that more was being sought in the "scientific method" than could

[36] Ibid., p. 8.
[37] In Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Union: Elusive Adversary," p. 7.
[38] Ibid.

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ever be provided. Others were troubled by the defense intellectuals' recommendations, which seemed to be based on a pseudo-scientific construct. Colin Gray writes that "in 1961, the promise was high. The civilian strategists came to Washington to assume influential roles" in the development of strategic and foreign policies in the Kennedy-McNamara team. However, by the 1970s, "it is fair to say that their performance had not lived up to their promise. And that's putting it mildly."[39]

Far from inventing a modern science for the management and prevention of nuclear war, the American defense intellectuals have in fact, projected a new American ideology in the form of strategic theory. This ideology, manifest in the theory of deterrence, simply reflects the inherent values and traditions of the intellectual class. Despite claims to universality and scientific objectivity, it is intensely ethnocentric and fails to take proper account of the deterrence partner, the Soviet Union.

In the final analysis, the defense intellectuals declined due to their failure to say what to do if deterrence failed. Their scientific pretensions created an aura of objectivity, but the tenuous relationship between their contrived world and the real one limited the practical utility of their conclusions. Their models could neither predict nor explain actual behavior. As Hedley Bull observed: "A great deal of argument about military strategy . . . postulates the 'rational action' of a kind of 'strategic man,' a man who on further acquaintance reveals himself to be a university professor of unusual intellectual subtlety."[40]

This problem points to the larger issue of intellectuals in power. Some observers, such as Edward C. Banfield go so far as to vigorously oppose this phenomenon: "The premium of scholarship for a professor is all too often originality, not correctness. A politician or businessman must pay the price for being wrong; the academic never does . . . I think it's a national tragedy that people in decision making roles turn over to intellectuals the right to make decisions. And it's bad for scholarship, too."[41]

Studies of the intellectual groups associated with the U.S. foreign and defense policy establishment challenges the image of the intellectual as an outsider. They give credence, rather, to Paul Hollander's observation that "the intelligentsia (or intellectuals) have a much longer history as upholders of the traditional world views and supporters of authority than as performers of their special role which prescribes the questioning of authority, marginality, and highly developed critical faculties."[42]

[39] Colin Gray, "What Rand Hath Wrought," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1971.
[40] Ibid., p. 184.
[41] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. xiv.
[42] Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims*, (New York: Harper, 1981), p. 41.

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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., observed that revolutions are always made by intellectuals who sooner or later are always replaced by practical men. The American defense intellectuals have indeed revolutionized the way we think about and plan for war in the nuclear context. Although their influence is waning, to be replaced by that of practical men, their ideas persist in different form. The defense intellectuals have created a theoretical system which, according to Fred Ikle, "works like a narcotic,"[43] creating a dangerous dependency that is difficult to escape.

Theodore White may have provided the proper epitaph on the defense intellectuals in the United States when he concluded his lengthy and enthusiastic reportage on the "action intellectuals" by recalling for us Thucydides' warning of the dangers posed by intellectuals in power: "It was, he said, frequently a misfortune to have very brilliant men in charge of affairs, they expect too much of ordinary men." And such men, in seeking "to impose logic on a people too fast" are dangerous to the people's welfare and security.[44]

[43] F. Ikle in "Can Deterrence Last Out the Century," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, p. 14.

[44] Cited in Theodore H. White, "Action Intellectuals."

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"GRENADES FROM THE CANDY STORE": BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1990s?

by Robbin Laird and David Robertson

There had been a remarkable degree of agreement between Britain's two major parties on defense policy from World War II to 1979, until the radicalization of the Labour party and Margaret Thatcher's election in 1979 heralded the breakdown of consensus. Today — as the recent election in Britain shows — defense policy lies at the heart of the conflict between the two major parties; and the third force in British politics, the Alliance (made up of Social Democrats and Liberals), disagrees within itself on defense policy.

This breakdown in the British consensus has critical importance for the United States and Western policy in general, for it occurs at a time of uncertainty for nuclear deterrence in Europe. Labour's allergy to nuclear weapons in Britain reinforces similar feelings on the Continent, especially in West Germany and the Low Countries. Its notion of "defensive deterrence" — which resists American ideas about changes in NATO's conventional doctrine — reinforces similar tendencies among social democratic parties in Western Europe, especially the Social Democratic Party in West Germany. Were either Labour or SPD to come to power, the British and German Left would challenge the very premises of U.S. leadership in the Western Alliance.

Two issues have provoked a serious conflict over the desirability of nuclear deterrence in the United Kingdom: the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and the Thatcher government's decision to purchase Trident submarine-launched ballistic-missiles (SLBMs). These deserve special attention.

Consensus

The Labour government that held office between 1945 and 1951 fundamentally agreed with the opposition Conservatives on defense policy. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin created NATO as much as any Western statesman. The Korean war prompted this government to begin a massive rearmament program. The British nuclear weapons program resulted from highly secret decisions by Prime Minister Clement Atlee and his inner cabinet.[1]

[1] Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence, 1945-1952* (London: Macmillan, 1976).

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A first breach in the consensus about Britain's military role occurred in the late 1950s. At the Labour party's annual conference of 1959, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) captured just enough trade union votes to pass a unilateral nuclear disarmament motion. The party leadership, however, rejected this position; Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell promised to "fight, fight, and fight again"[2] to secure the reversal of this policy, and did so with success. Again in 1964, the Labour party's official election manifesto included a commitment to discontinue the Polaris purchase that Conservative Prime Minister Macmillan had negotiated with President Kennedy in 1963. But after his narrow victory in 1964, the new Labour leaders, Harold Wilson and Denis Healey, had no trouble persuading Labour members of Parliament that funds already expended were too high to cancel the Polaris squadron. The cheapness of Polaris — which came in under the original estimate and operated at a cost of less than three percent of the defense budget — then removed the issue of Britain's nuclear role from politics for nearly fifteen years.

Britain's economic decline, however, led to a series of defense reviews during the 1964-1970 period when Labour held power. (A "defense review" is code for "forfeiting defense obligations.") As Britain's armed forces oriented themselves toward NATO, the capability for military action "East of Suez" was lost. These changes met with only muted Conservative opposition, not surprisingly, as it was the Conservatives in 1957 who abolished conscription for national service and started — although not publicly — the process that led to the abandonment of out-of-area capabilities. When the Conservatives came to power in 1970 they made no serious effort to alter Labour's defense reductions.

Just as a strong defense met general approval in the 1945-1964 period, so was dismantling not controversial in the 1964-1979 period. To be sure, factions of the two parties disagreed with the defense portion of government expenditures, but they had no real power and that portion remained more or less constant from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. Defense politics simply did not count in electoral terms; therefore, it made little sense for the leadership to listen to any of the more extreme elements in their parties that might wish to advocate other policies.

This long-term consensus entailed three specific objectives. First, Britain should be a loyal member of NATO, though with an Atlanticist leaning. Second, Britain should have a minimal nuclear deterrent integrated with the U.S. strategic nuclear force. Third, Britain should have an all-volunteer force, making up in professionalism what it lacked in equipment.

[2] See Philip Williams, *Hugh Gaitskell* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979).

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The development program for the Polaris missiles, known as Chevaline, provides an example of the degree of harmony over defense policy in the highest stratum in British politics. Initiated by Conservative Prime Minister Heath in 1972 without the knowledge of his full cabinet, this program was carried on in the same secrecy by Labour Prime Ministers Harold Wilson (1974-76) and James Callaghan (1976-79). Not until 1980, after the completion of the Chevaline program, did the newly elected Conservative government admit to parliament — and the shocked ex-members of several cabinets — that Chevaline existed, and had cost over 1 billion sterling.

Breakdown of Consensus

What happened in the late 1970s to break up this happy state of affairs? Two unconnected issues surfaced simultaneously during a period of confusion in British politics. First came the Euromissile issue, which had nothing directly to do with British defense policy. Britain had always based part of the NATO theater nuclear force, including F-111 squadrons. The deployment of American cruise missiles, however, awakened the long quiescent Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament movement. Radical Britons joined counterparts in West Germany and the Low Countries to stage a European-wide opposition against the modernization of nuclear arms.

Second, the Callaghan government accepted the view of military advisers and of defense analysts that Polaris submarines, first deployed in 1968, had neared the end of their useful lives and would soon have to be replaced. By the 1980s, the Polaris squadron would never guarantee more than one submarine on patrol at any one time. Each vessel was armed with sixteen missiles; each of these had only three non-MIRVed warheads. Thus Britain could not hope to attack more than sixteen targets. The United Kingdom was equipped only for a last resort retaliation against the Soviet Union after Britain's own nuclear destruction. The cabinet appointed a sub-committee (which included Foreign Secretary David Owen) to consider various options for replacing the submarine squadron by the 1990s.

But before any decision on a successor system could be made, Labour suffered an overwhelming defeat at the hands of Margaret Thatcher in the 1979 elections. Thatcher, an avowedly radical Conservative who rejected the policies of previous administrations in everything from economic management to defense, changed the terms of the debate. The Labour party tore itself apart in the aftermath of defeat, wracked by the fury of its long-ignored left wing. This wing had argued that the party and its self-appointed oligarchical leadership had failed its working-class constituencies from the 1960s on by refusing to pursue radical policies. It sought a remedy in greater democracy within the Labour party, knowing that local party activists and trade union leaders would support the far left.

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These changes were in fact made and the left did take virtual control of the party. Its rise led to the election of Michael Foot, long-time anti-nuclear activist, as party leader; it also led to a schism in the party. Some leaders, including many highly placed members in the Callaghan government, abandoned Labour to form the rival Social Democratic party (SDP). The SDP was mainly distinguished from its old friends by its defense policies; the former Labour leaders who created the SDP, particularly former Foreign Secretary David Owen, were the leaders of the party's Atlanticist (and therefore nuclear) wing. Although other leaders stayed on in Labour, notably the former chancellor of the exchequer and secretary for defense, Denis Healey, their presence increased the public perception of party disunity. The Left was further convinced that only a coherent and "pure" set of radical policies could end this disunity and save Labour from defeat.

In such an environment it was inevitable that defense policy should become a matter of controversy. The Thatcher government increased defense spending until it accounted for only slightly less of Britain's GNP than America's. To make matters even more contentious, this occurred while the government tried to trim public expenditures. These increases were less of a statement about Conservative priorities than they seemed, however, for the Callaghan government had committed itself to accept President Carter's 1978 call for NATO members to increase defense expenditures by 3 percent per annum. What made Britain stand out was that it was the only European government that actually carried out its promise to do so. Consequently, the public perceived military expenditures as having a much higher priority than in the past, and both the government and the opposition were happy to encourage this impression.

While defense experts debated various modernization schemes for the Polaris submarines, it was generally expected that the existing minimal deterrent would be replaced by something at roughly the same level. This expectation was not to be met. The government decision in 1980 to replace Polaris with a Trident missile system from the United States transformed Britain's military stance and rendered inter-party cooperation on defense issues impossible.

At first, the government wanted to buy the Trident C4 missile. This would have enhanced British nuclear forces considerably, and it raised a storm of protest. Specifically, the cost (about £5 billion in 1980) seriously strained defense budgeting. In 1981, upon learning that the United States had decided to accelerate deployment of the Trident D5 missile, the government opted for that instead. But the D5 cost even more, about £9 billion,[3] for it requires extra missiles and a completely re-designed and much larger class of submarines.

[3] *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986), p.38.

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In contrast to the Polaris, whose very lack of credibility had quieted concerns about Britain's nuclear role, Trident D5 offered real offensive capabilities. The Thatcher government planned to build four submarines, each of which would carry sixteen ballistic missiles. Since each missile could carry fourteen MIRVed warheads, this represented an increase in the number of potential Soviet targets from sixteen to four hundred forty-eight, or twenty-eight times more! Even if one accepts the Ministry of Defence assurance that the D5 would carry no more warheads than had been planned for the C4, namely eight,[4] it meant an increase of fourteen times. This massive capability incensed the Labour party, which was committed to nuclear disarmament.

The 1983 general election focused on the deeply divided Labour party, which under Michael Foot had adopted a program of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Labour lost terribly, and no doubt this policy played a major part in the results. From the radical left's point of view, however, the problem lay in Labour's disunity, due to Denis Healey and James Callaghan failing to support unilateralism. In the aftermath of the election Labour could either reconsider its radical policies or it could pursue them with even more determination. It chose the latter, and elected Neil Kinnock, a respectable left-wing junior member, as its leader. Kinnock's views on defense strengthened the anti-nuclear sentiments of radical elements in the party.

As the 1987 elections approached, the two major parties took clear stands: one sought the most extensive reduction in British military power ever proposed to the electorate and the other intended to add significantly to the country's military capacity. They did not disagree on every security issue; for example, both parties promised to retain and augment the United Kingdom's conventional force strength.

The Conservative party's decisive victory in the recent election did repudiate Labour's defense program, to be sure. But whether its own plans will be executed is another question. Budgetary problems facing British defense planners are severe and might lead to a reduction in British conventional forces, a concern voiced by both the Labour party and the Alliance.

The Budget Crunch

The Thatcher government's actual record on defense spending has been less impressive than one might think. To be sure, it did carry out the NATO 3 percent increase, but just barely. Then, immediately after the 1983 election, the Treasury prevented the Ministry of Defence from continuing the annual increase after 1986. Indeed, that summer's *Defence Statement* projected a 6 percent cut

[4] *Trident and the Alternatives* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1987), p.1.

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in real defense expenditure between 1985-86 and 1988-89;[5] when inflation is accounted for, this actually amounts to a 10 percent cut.

To make matters worse, defense authorizations have not been fully funded since at least 1982. The trouble dates back to 1981 when Secretary of Defence John Nott attempted to cut British defense commitments by reducing the Royal Navy's force surface fleet and projection capabilities. Nott's cuts were never implemented, however, because the Falklands conflict of April-June 1982 gained the navy a reprieve. Among other things, the war boosted the navy's case for keeping three small aircraft carriers, retaining and even replacing its amphibious warfare ships, and maintaining a minimum of fifty frigates. The navy got its way, but all the other services lost.

The air force saw the already long-term procurement plan for the Tornado fighter/bomber stretched even further. The army lost the new battle tanks needed to re-equip armored regiments in Germany, as well as other important programs. For example, British forces in Germany, along with the rest of European NATO, are committed to the Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine, which is seen by many as a watered down "Deep Strike/Airland Battle 2000" doctrine. If this is the case, it depends on the same advanced weaponry that the U.S. forces are supposed to be getting, and there is no way that the British Army of the Rhine will be equipped for this role in the near future.

Even the navy did not get all it wanted. It failed to commission the three frigates needed each year to retain a fifty-ship surface fleet. By summer 1986 the Ministry of Defence began referring to a target of "around fifty frigates." Then it announced the postponement of that year's third frigate to save £200 million for new amphibious warfare ships, without which the marines could not fulfill its NATO duty of rapidly reinforcing Norway.

The Trident aggravated these problems. If the current estimate of £9.2 billion (in 1987 prices) is correct, the program will consume 12 percent of the total military procurement budget over the 1985-1995 period, and much more during the peak spending years of 1990-95. This coincides with the years of major costs for the European fighter aircraft (EFA) — the new air superiority fighter for the British, German, and Italian air forces. Its price should be even more than Trident, probably about £17 billion. The military budget would be in trouble even without Trident or the EFA; with these two programs, there is no possibility of reaching the United Kingdom's stated defense goals.

Despite these projected shortfalls, the government denies any need for a formal defense review. The government's opponents have

[5] *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1986), p. 40.

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seized upon the issue of defense deficiencies as a means of attacking and embarrassing Thatcher's administration. They insist that a review of defense programs is urgently required. The government, on the other hand, is equally adamant in its refusal to carry out a review. Although the 1986 *Defence Estimates* acknowledged the real money cuts in budgeting, the secretary of defence refused Parliamentary demands for a review of defense programs. He continued to refuse even when it became apparent that the Ministry of Defence was underfunded on current procurement programs by £1 billion. And in late autumn of 1986, when the government cancelled the Nimrod airborne radar program after spending £930 million and ordered Boeing AWACs at £1 billion, there was still no public defense review.

Assuming the defense budget will not grow by much, the problem then is, what can be cut? Britain's defense posture has been reduced to four tasks: defense of the United Kingdom and its airspace, anti-submarine warfare in the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel, a contribution to NATO's central front with the British Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany, and retention of an independent nuclear deterrent.

Homeland air defense has already been pared to the bone and cannot be trimmed. An anti-submarine warfare role is needed for home defense and constitutes one of the United Kingdom's most significant contributions to NATO; it provides approximately 70 percent of the anti-submarine coverage in the Eastern Atlantic. The Central Front has a permanent forward deployment of fifty-five thousand British men (out of an entire army of only 180,000) and a tactical air force containing more than 60 percent of the Tornado strike force. Britain provides nearly 20 percent of the allied military manpower stationed in Germany in peacetime. The British Army of the Rhine accounted for 14 percent of the British Army thirty years ago and now for 34 percent. Similarly, RAF Germany accounted for 4 percent of the Air Force in the early 1950s and now 10 percent. But the Conservatives regard this as sacrosanct and will not touch it. The Conservative government also considers the strategic nuclear force mandatory.

While Britain still has a limited ability to undertake military operations outside of Europe, hardly any forces are specially maintained for this purpose. The Falklands are an exception, of course; but after the airbase and garrison infrastructure were built between 1982 and 1986, the annual cost is only £300 million, or less than 2 percent of an £18 billion defense budget.

To those who wish to rid Britain of nuclear weapons, these budgetary dilemmas are almost welcome. If Trident causes problems in the budget, abolish it, they say, and use the money for conventional arms. The fallacy here is twofold. Although Trident is expensive, it is not so expensive that the money saved could buy much additional

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conventional force. One authoritative estimate puts the opportunity cost of Trident at two hundred twenty main battle tanks, twelve naval frigates or fifty Tornados with operating bases.[6] Even this assessment overstates the savings to be gained from cancelling Trident; tanks are very expensive to maintain; once acquired, Trident should cost no more than Polaris, which requires only two thousand men to operate and commands about 2 percent of the budget. Second, the logic of gaining savings from rejecting Trident works only if one assumes that Britain's nuclear deterrent contributes little or nothing to British security.

Opinion on Defense Issues

The British electorate took little notice of defense issues before 1983.[7] The parties predicted that defense would be vital in 1987, and they were right. Defense issues still trailed domestic issues by far. A poll published in early December 1986 (days after the Labour party published its security policy), placed defense as the second most important issue, after unemployment. But the difference betwen the first and second place issues told something about British priorities: unemployment was mentioned by 82 percent and defense by only 25 percent. Also, a month earlier, the figures had been 84 percent and 14 percent.

Attitudes toward nuclear issues are especially fickle. A poll commissioned in August 1986 reported 46 percent disagreement and 44 percent agreement with the proposition "Britain should get rid of its nuclear weapons whatever other countries do." A similar question from a poll taken in early November 1986 ("Do you think that Britain should or should not continue to possess nuclear weapons as long as the Soviet Union has them?") produced the following result: should possess nuclear weapons, 66 percent; should not, 27 percent. Both polls were taken by Gallup.[8]

Despite these discrepancies, polls taken over the years confirm that the majority of Britons advocate retaining a nuclear force. Gallup polls taken in January 1983 and October 1986, for example, produce figures statistically indistinguishable, 63 and 57 percent respectively, for retaining some form of nuclear weapons, and 30 percent and 35 percent for having none at all.[9]

[6] *The Times*, November 11, 1984.

[7] Many analysts assumed that the Falklands Factor, the upsurge of public confidence after the recapture of the Falklands, helped Mrs. Thatcher win the 1983 election. Recent analysis has conclusively demonstrated, however, that public opinion gains by Thatcher were temporary and had little impact on voting. The 1987 election, which the Tories won by almost the same amount as in 1983, proved this even more conclusively. See David Sanders, "The Falklands Factor and the 1983 General Elections," *British Journal of Political Science*, Spring 1987.

[8] See *Daily Telegraph*, November 15, 1986.

[9] See *Daily Telegraph*, November 4, 1986.

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The unilateralists' constituency does not coincide closely with class. Core working-class Labour supporters range in attitude from indifference to relative hawkishness, as do core middle-class Conservative voters. One example may be seen in a poll taken for the BBC during one highly publicized by-election campaign in the Lancashire working-class constituency of Knowsley North in November 1986. Labour won this by-election, polling 45 percent more than the second place Alliance candidate. The poll inquired about voter preference regarding Britain's possession of nuclear weapons:

TABLE 1

"Should Britain rid itself of nuclear weapons while persuading others to do the same or should it keep its nuclear weapons until we can persuade others to get rid of theirs?"

	ALL %	LAB %	ALLIANCE %	CON %
Get Rid	32	40	21	10
Keep Weapons	64	57	77	89
Don't Know	4	3	2	2

SOURCE: *The Guardian*, November 5, 1986.

The sticking point is that nearly 60 percent of those who intended to vote Labour rejected the policy of nuclear disarmament.[10]

Prospects

Although Tories are strongly pro-NATO, allocations to NATO are uncertain. The cost of Trident has caused deep concern within the government and the Conservative party. A number of Ministry of Defence officials fear that this purchase will reduce funds available for modernizing conventional forces, notably the British Army of the Rhine or naval forces. They fear that the Trident will come at the expense of British forces committed to European defense.[11] But a Thatcher government will not abandon any of its NATO duties, if its past choices and present rhetoric are a guide. The air-land contribution, in particular, will be preserved at any cost. Were the Conservatives forced to choose (a likely possibility within a few years), there is little doubt that the navy would bear a disproportionate share of the cuts.

While it is possible that London will cut its forces serving NATO tasks to save money, three factors argue against major reductions in deployed forces. First, while the commitment of fifty-five thousand

[10] See *The Guardian*, November 5, 1986.
[11] Based on interviews conducted by the authors since the early 1980s.

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men to the British Army of the Rhine is not explicitly stated in the Brussels Treaty, this is the long-standing interpretation of Britain's commitment. Reversing this obligation would not be taken lightly. Second, unless the forces were also to be phased out entirely, withdrawal from the Continent would not save much; indeed, a large-scale withdrawal would cost more than it saved. Third, the reaction of the United States Congress to a British withdrawal would be severe, and could lead to a cut of American troops in Europe.

Indeed, the Thatcher government is unusual among Conservative administrations in its willingness to increase defense spending. Neither the Conservative governments of the late fifties and early sixties nor the Edward Heath government of 1970-74 showed significantly higher defense expenditures than the Labour governments. And Conservatives abolished conscription and ended the development of a land-based intermediate-range ballistic-missile. The current stagnation in defense spending thus closely reflects the historic pattern of Conservative party spending on defense.

Further, one should not assume that Thatcher's pro-Americanism represents the feelings of the Conservative party as a whole, where a strongly anti-American and pro-European outlook has an important presence. Anti-Americanism was manifested in the anger of Conservative backbenchers over the American use of British bases for the F-111s used to raid Libya in April 1986. Many Conservative members of Parliament who voted with the government on this matter did so out of a sense of loyalty to the prime minister. Several of them emphasized in private that they would not again vote in support of such an action.

Pro-Europeanism became evident in the Westland affair. Defence Minister Michael Heseltine attempted to put together a European consortium to buy out Westland Helicopter in an effort to prevent a takeover bid by Sikorsky, an American firm. Heseltine claimed that the need for a European helicopter industry separate from the American one was his prime motive. Thatcher supported the Sikorsky bid as a "free market" action, which was not in the interest of her government to stop and Heseltine resigned.

In short, most Conservative leaders support a strong defense, but not at the expense of British economic development. The party is strongly pro-NATO but not necessarily pro-American. Shifting attitudes could provide the basis for a post-Thatcher leadership moving in the direction of support for European leadership within the Atlantic Alliance.

The 1987 Election

The Tory party's standing in the opinion polls steadily improved throughout the year preceding the 1987 election. But important marginal seats looked vulnerable, especially in the Midlands, and how

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well it would do in an actual election remained unclear. Opposition parties had led or tied the Conservatives in many opinion polls. Polls also revealed that the prime minister was less popular than the party; Thatcher's reputation as "uncaring" or "dictatorial" had become a liability.

The Labour party sought to play on the personality issue by emphasizing the "human qualities" of their candidate. The party ran several successful advertising spots focusing on Neil and Glenys Kinnock as sensitive people concerned with overcoming the divisiveness of Britain under Thatcher. The party manifesto was short and emphasized essentials without providing grist for the Tory campaign mill. Socialism disappeared almost entirely from Labour's campaign effort.

The Labour leadership recognized that defense was a liability and tried to de-emphasize the topic during the campaign. Denis Healey gave an important speech at the outset of the campaign which emphasized Labour's interest in conventional defense (and said little about its nuclear disarmament policy). But he soon made an astonishing slip of the tongue when he indicated, in Moscow, that the Soviet leadership was "praying" for a Labour victory. During the second week of the campaign the *Sunday Telegraph* printed a purported leak of a U.S. government document giving potential American responses to a nuclear-free Britain policy.

Then came the issue of how Britain would defend itself without nuclear weapons. In an interview, Neil Kinnock said that he would rely on the ability of the British to use guerrilla tactics to defend themselves against invasion. Mrs. Thatcher seized this opportunity to drive home the point that the Labour party was unsound on defense matters and senior Tory leaders joined in a chorus of accusations. Michael Heseltine gave a colorful speech in Wales informing the local audience that Labour would resist the Russians by "mounting guns on the Barclays Bank on the right, and by throwing grenades from the candy store on the left."

Despite Labour's efforts, defense came to play an important role in the campaign. Poll data and our observation of Tory members of Parliament canvassing their local constituencies showed that defense issues activated Tory supporters to join the campaign and to vote. For those who identified with the Tory party, defense reinforced the sense that Labour leaders were untrustworthy leaders of left-wing undesirables.

The Alliance abetted the attack on Labour's defense policy, with David Owen's strident criticism of unilateral disarmament leading the charge. But the Alliance had problems of its own on defense. A long-standing dispute had been simmering between the Liberals and the Social Democratic party over the issue of the need to replace the Polaris. The Liberal party, having long favored nuclear disar-

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mament, was inclined to eliminate British strategic weapons. In contrast, the Social Democratic party leadership, especially David Owen, favored a British nuclear deterrent. The Alliance Defence Commission was to have resolved this dispute; not surprisingly, it failed because the Liberal party refused to endorse a successor system for Polaris. The Alliance leadership finally reached a compromise at the end of 1986 and the result was an opaque party manifesto: "In government we would maintain, with whatever necessary modernization, our minimum nuclear deterrent until it can be negotiated away, as part of a global arms negotiation process, in return for worthwhile concessions by the USSR which would enhance British and European security. In any such modernization we would maintain our capability in the sense of freezing our capacity at a level no greater than that of the Polaris system."[12]

The Alliance, however, being unable to commit itself to an alternative to Polaris, appeared unwilling to support the continued presence of the nuclear deterrent. With this for a platform, it is easy to see why defense issues contributed little to Alliance strength in the elections.

Election results confirmed the government's policy. Trident will be a fact by the time of the next election while conflict in the government will continue over the priorities of conventional modernization. The Labour party will almost certainly persist in its determination to eliminate the British nuclear deterrent, but the leadership will attempt to moderate its stance on the U.S. nuclear bases.

The Alliance faces an uncertain future. The Social Democratic party feels strong pressure to accept the offer of a merger with the Liberal party, pressure that will probably prove irresistible despite David Owen's strong opposition. At best, a merged party would provide lukewarm support for maintaining the nuclear deterrent. It might seek an electoral pact with Labour for the next election.

Conclusions

Britain's defense predicament has important implications for the United States. A number of U.S. initiatives indicate an intention to continue the special relationship with Britain, including the offer to share advanced technologies and the Strategic Defense Initiative. In return, the U.S. seeks British help in persuading other Europeans to participate in these projects.

But strains in the relationship are likely. One has to do with the interest in Britain to strengthen the European connection. Even Mrs. Thatcher — a staunch, old-fashioned Atlanticist — is changing her ap-

[12] *Britain United: The Time Has Come* (London: The SDP/Liberal Alliance Programme for Government, 1987).

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proach after Reykjavik, with a new stress on her role as a European leader. Members of her government, notably her foreign minister, favor greater emphasis on European versus Atlantic relations.

Although Thatcher's victory guarantees the acquisition of Trident, a de facto defense review is likely to take place during the government's first two years. Options proposed in the Nott review of 1981 will probably be re-examined, and again the Navy and out-of-Europe force projection will be most vulnerable. The navy lobby will no doubt manage to divert some of the cuts, with the result being more procurement stretching plus project cancellation for the British Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany. By the end of the century, Britain may be fielding troops that are much less well equipped than its NATO allies; to compensate for this weakness, it will almost inevitably concentrate on strategic deterrence by relying on Trident. And even though Trident will be in place by the next election, the controversy over the future role of Britain in European nuclear deterrence will not abate. A Tory victory in 1987 does not eliminate the possibility of a non-nuclear Britain by the 1990s.

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

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PROFILE: HAFIZ al-ASAD OF SYRIA

by Moshe Ma'oz

Hafiz al-Asad is one of the most powerful, intriguing, and controversial leaders of the contemporary Middle East. Although a member of an esoteric and rural minority sect that represents only 12 percent of the total population of Syria, he rules this predominantly Sunni Muslim country without challenge. If Asad's regime is a military dictatorship in the eyes of many Sunnis, he has stayed in power since 1970 — far longer than any previous ruler in modern Syrian history. More than this, Asad has transformed Syria into a regional power, the first Arab state able single-handedly to challenge Israel's military superiority.

Asad's achievements raise several questions. How did a poor 'Alawi peasant boy rise so swiftly through the military ranks and become the ruler of his country by the age of 40? How has Asad controlled this divisive and restless people for so long? How did he transform this feeble and fragmented polity into a stable and strong state, even a regional power? What are his ultimate goals — simply to sustain his rule, to make Syria a true nation, or to unify the Arab East and lead it to a historic victory over Israel?

An 'Alawi Boy Becomes a Syrian-Arab Nationalist

Asad was born on October 6, 1930, to a poor peasant family in Qardaha, an 'Alawi mountain village in the north-east of Syria, the eldest son in a family of six boys and two girls. Hafiz was called Abu Sulayman, after his grandfather, who reportedly had fought the Ottoman Turks before 1918. Hafiz's father, 'Ali, a hard-scrabble farmer, was also known for his opposition to Syria's French rulers during the 1920s and 1930s. In a rare reference to his childhood, Asad credits his father with instilling in him both Syrian-Arab patriotism and pride in his 'Alawi heritage. This suggests that as a boy, Hafiz al-Asad was pulled in two different directions — 'Alawi-sectarian and Syrian-Arab nationalist.

Asad moved to the nearby town of Latakia for his secondary schooling, where he was soon immersed in that new radical political environment. Having received an Arab nationalistic education and developed a keen interest in Arab history and geography, he quickly became involved in anti-French political activities and emerged as a high-school student leader. In the process, Hafiz distanced himself from his 'Alawi identity; perhaps most revealing was the change of

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family name about this time or earlier. His original family name had been Wahsh, ("wild beast" in Arabic), a name that had pejorative connotations; he changed this to Asad ("lion" in Arabic), a symbol of both strength and dignity.

Sunni Muslims had traditionally looked down on the 'Alawis as religious heretics, political separatists, and social inferiors. In the face of such attitudes, ambitious young 'Alawis of Asad's generation looked to the emerging radical parties of the 1930s and 1940s for opportunities. These parties stood for socioeconomic change and nonsectarianism.

At the age of just sixteen years, Asad was, like many of his contemporaries, ready to join one of the modern ideological parties struggling for Syrian independence from France. Young 'Alawis, Druze, and Christians tended to join one of the four parties which forwarded progressive ideas about society, the economy, and religion. These included: the Syrian Communist party, the Syrian Nationalist party (later known as the Syrian Social Nationalist party, or SSNP), the League for National Action, and the Arab Ba'th (Resurrection) Party.

The Communist party had little appeal to 'Alawis, due to its radical philosophy and Soviet ties, nor was it active in the 'Alawi region. In contrast, the SSNP, founded by Antun Sa'ada, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christian, drew many 'Alawis to its ranks, as well as other non-Sunni Syrians, owing to its clearly defined and attractive principles about the existence of a Greater Syrian nation, the separation of church and state, the removal of sectarianism, the abolition of feudal ties, and so forth.[1]

The League of National Action also attracted Young 'Alawis; rather, its leader, Zaki Arsuzi, an 'Alawi intellectual, attracted them. Arsuzi broke away from the League in the late 1930s and founded a small movement called Al-Ba'th al-Arab (the Arab Renaissance). Although its headquarters was in Damascus, the party was active in Latakia during the mid-1940s. Most members were 'Alawis, including, perhaps, young Hafiz al-Asad.[2] This party then joined with another Ba'th party, founded in 1940 by Michel 'Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian, and Salah ad-Din al-Baytar, a Sunni Muslim.

The second Ba'th party professed three main principles: unity, socialism, and freedom. Its doctrine stressed the unity of the Arab nation, arguing that Arab unity is a precondition for the solution of Arab problems. Most Ba'thists, like Asad, were secondary-school students who embraced the romantic nationalist message of the new

[1] See *The Principles of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party* (n. d., n. p.); and *Note of the Syrian National Party to the League of Nations* (1936). For a detailed study, see L. Z. Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[2] E. Rouleau, "The Syrian Enigma: What is the Ba'th?" *New Left Review*, no. 45 (1967). See also Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963-67* (Jerusalem: Israeli University Press, 1972), p. 7, n.

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party. The non-Sunnis among them, attracted by the secularist notions of the Ba'th, sought to be accepted as equals into a new nonsectarian Syrian-Arab community. Young Asad reportedly organized a Ba'th cell at his secondary school in Latakia in 1947.

The ranks of this party were greatly increased in 1953, when scores of Sunni peasants from the Syrian lowlands joined. Originally followers of Akram al-Hawrani's Arab Socialist Party, the peasants saw the Ba'th as a tool in their struggle against the landlords. Its growing membership (2,500 in 1954) and efficient organization permitted the Ba'th party to outnumber its rivals. In the 1954 elections, it won twenty-two out of the 142 seats in the Syrian Parliament. The majority of parliamentary seats were still held, however, by members of the old-style nationalist parties, and the Parliamentary road to political ascendancy appeared too difficult. The army officer corps offered a shorter and more promising avenue to power. Unlike the Ba'th party, which was still numerically small and politically marginal, the Syrian army after 1949 became deeply involved and influential in post-independence national politics.

A Soldier Climbs to Power

In the tradition of young 'Alawis (as well as other minorities), Asad enlisted in the Syrian army, volunteered to fight against the newly emerging Jewish state of Israel in 1947-48, and in 1952 registered in the Military Academy of Homs. Possibly influenced by the fact that 'Alawi officers had commanded the Syrian air force in 1950 and 1952, Asad later attended the Air Force Academy in Aleppo. His flying talent won him the best-aviator trophy upon graduation as a combat pilot in 1955. Holding the rank of lieutenant, Asad continued his training in Egypt. Promoted in 1957 to the rank of squadron commander, Asad subsequently went to the Soviet Union for a course in flying MiG-17s.

Asad was not content with a professional military career; he joined the Ba'th military faction in the army, which in 1957-58 acquired a dominant position. But at that juncture, fresh political upheavals threatened his future. The 1958-61 union of Syria and Egypt as the United Arab Republic, though initiated by the Ba'th party, led to the party's dissolution. Its leaders were demoted to junior positions, its military members dismissed or transferred to Egypt. Captain Asad endured the latter fate.

Hard working, discreet, skillful, and ambitious, Asad became one of the leaders of the Ba'thist Military Committee established in Egypt with the aim of seizing power in Syria. But it acted too slowly; and when Syria seceded from the UAR in September 1961, Asad was eased out of the army by the new rightist regime in Damascus and placed in a minor clerical position at the Transportation Ministry.

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Despite this reversal, Asad continued his activities in the clandestine Ba'th Military Committee and played a significant role in the March 1963 Ba'thist military coup. Promoted quickly to major and lieutenant colonel, he was by the end of 1963 in charge of the Syrian air force. By the end of 1964 he became major-general and commander of the Syrian air force. Asad appointed his confidants to sensitive positions and established an independent intelligence network under the command of Muhammad al-Khuli. The air force intelligence network took on assignments far beyond the usual scope of air-force intelligence. It appears that Asad was preparing himself for an active role in future power struggles.

During the first stage of that struggle, Asad remained a junior partner in an 'Alawi military triumvirate that included Generals Muhammad 'Umran and Salah Jadid. When conflict erupted between Umran and General Amin al-Hafiz, the newly emerging Sunni strong man of the Ba'th regime, Asad and Jadid sided with Hafiz against 'Umran. Asad's decision was based on a cool evaluation of the power balance between Umran and Hafiz. Through similar calculations, and with the support of his powerful 'Alawi faction, Asad joined forces in February 1966 with Jadid against Hafiz. According to Tabitha Petran, this was "Syria's thirteenth and bloodiest army *coup* in seventeen years. . . . Its success was assured by the switch of General Hafez Assad to the side of the insurrection."[3]

Rising to the position of defense minister and becoming number two in command, Asad then prepared the ground to oust Jadid. To undermine Jadid's position, he employed brutal force and political manipulation. He exploited defeats of the Syrian army — the War of 1967 and the 1970 fiasco in Jordan — to discredit Jadid and extend his control over the armed forces and the Ba'th party. In two military coups (February 1969 and November 1970), Asad evicted and arrested Jadid and his senior advisers, becoming the unchallenged ruler of Syria.

The Quest for Legitimacy

Once in power, Asad not only secured his control over the army by establishing a wide network of security organizations, but he sought to build a broad base of support among the Syrian population, Sunni and non-Sunni alike. From the outset, this meant avoiding an appearance of relying on 'Alawi and military support. Asad sought rather to project his government as constitutional and democratic, and himself as a popular national leader deriving his authority from the people. It is not inconceivable that Asad was motivated by a genuine sense of nationalist mission and the belief that his leadership well served both Syrian national interests and the Arab cause.

[3] Petran, *Syria* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972) p. 243.

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To gain legitimacy, Asad needed to appear as the legal representative of the Ba'th party. Thus, he established a new Ba'th apparatus composed of his own supporters, who promptly elected him secretary general. A new People's Assembly (parliament) nominated him early in 1971 as the sole candidate for Syria's presidency. 99.2 percent of the voters endorsed Asad as president in a referendum in March 1971. 99.6 percent re-elected him in 1978 and 99.9 percent in 1985.

While continuing to use the Ba'th party, including its ideology and its apparatus, as instruments of rule, Asad established a powerful centralized presidential system with absolute authority. For the first time in modern history, Syria's leader is not just "supreme leader of the army and armed forces," but has assumed almost unlimited powers in legislation administration, in domestic policy, and in foreign affairs.[4]

It was a bold move on Asad's part to rule Syria as president, a position always reserved for Sunni Muslims. Asad presented himself as a devout Muslim, to be sure, and hailed the role of Islam in national life. He participated in public prayers and religious ceremonies, and made the minor pilgrimage to Mecca; reportedly, the Sunni Mufti of Damascus confirmed him as an authentic Muslim.[5] He used Islamic terms in his speeches, including *jihad* (righteous war) and *shahada* (martyrdom); he encouraged the construction of new mosques, raised the salaries of many religious functionaries, and appointed a Sunni as minister of religious endowments. Asad also appointed Sunnis personally loyal to him to senior positions. All prime ministers, defense and foreign ministers, and most of the cabinet ministers in Asad's governments have been Sunni Muslims. These include Mustafa Tallas and 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, his long-time defense and foreign ministers. Other prominent Sunnis are Hikmat Shihabi, the army's chief of staff, and Zuhayr Mashariqa, deputy secretary general of the Ba'th party and vice president since 1984.

Besides maintaining this Sunni-Muslim façade, Asad has portrayed his regime as a democracy. Several parties joined the Ba'th party to form a National Progressive Front. About half the members of parliament represent peasants and workers, a number of popular organizations of women, students, teachers, and the like.[6]

Asad hopes these steps will strengthen his regime; he also has a deep sense of mission and an apparently sincere concern for the well-being of the people, especially the underprivileged. Labeling his domestic reform policies a "corrective movement," Asad made great

[4] See the Permanent Constitution of the Syrian-Arab Republic, Damascus, January 31, 1973.

[5] U. I. Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria* (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1983), p. 111; and *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 17, 1971 and December 24, 1972.

[6] Hafiz Asad, *Khutab wa-Kalimat wa-Tasrihat* (Damascus, 1981), p. 32.

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efforts and achieved substantial results, particularly during the first six or seven years of his rule. Alongside his efforts to advance agriculture and develop modern industry, the conditions of many peasants and workers were improved in matters of financial income and social security, as well as educational and health services. The urban middle classes — merchants, artisans, shopkeepers, and the like were also given greater economic opportunities by Asad.[7]

Still, all has not been without difficulties. The continued Sunni opposition to his regime and the shortcomings of his socioeconomic policies reinforced Asad's tendency to give top attention to Syria's regional affairs, especially intra-Arab affairs and the conflict against Israel. Asad possibly calculated that working for Arab unity and stepping up the struggle against Israel were likely to strengthen his legitimacy and leadership in the eyes of the Syrian population. Asad hoped to score quick gains abroad to ease the treatment of domestic problems requiring long-term efforts.

After coming to power, Asad joined the newly established Federation of Arab Republics (with Egypt and Libya) and signed a military pact with Egypt. He built a strong military force and prepared it for confrontation with Israel, hoping to compel Israel to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights lost in 1967.

After allocating up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and receiving large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union, Asad was ready in late 1973 to join Sadat in the Yom Kippur War against Israel.[8] Although the Syrian army was badly defeated in the war, Asad emerged as a hero in Syria. His subsequent war of attrition against Israel in the spring of 1974 gained Asad the respect and admiration of Arabs throughout the region. Many began to regard him as the new Arab leader, as the successor of Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir (Nasser).[9]

Personality Cult and Regional Ambitions

Indeed, since his ascendancy in November 1970 (just weeks after 'Abd an-Nasir's death), Asad has alluded to being 'Abd an-Nasir's successor. He constructed a presidential rule along 'Abd an-Nasir's lines, praised the Egyptian's leadership, and publicly displayed their portraits together.

An even greater model for Asad has been Salah ad-Din (Saladin) al-Ayyubi, the legendary leader of Kurdish extraction who unified the Muslims in the twelfth century and defeated the Crusaders. Asad displays a large painting of Saladin's victory over the Crusaders in

[7] For details about Asad's domestic policies during the early 1970s, see M. Kerr, "Hafiz Asad and the Changing Patterns of Syrian Politics," *International Journal*, vol. 28 (1975).

[8] For details, see Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1975); Zeev Schiff, *October Earthquake* (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Zmora and Bitan, 1974).

[9] See *Tishrin* (Syria), November 22, 1976.

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his office; he speaks in ceremonies at Saladin's tomb, and features Saladin on Syrian currency. In speeches and conversation, Asad frequently hails Saladin's successes and his victory over the Crusaders, while referring to Israel as the new Crusader state.

Henry Kissinger, who deliberated with Asad in 1974, mentions the painting in Asad's office: "The symbolism was plain enough: Asad frequently pointed out that Israel would sooner or later suffer the same fate."[10] After visiting Asad in 1984, President Jimmy Carter noted that Asad "seemed to speak like a modern Saladin, feeling that it was his dual obligation to rid the region of all foreign presence while preserving Damascus as the only focal point for Arab unity today."[11]

In promoting himself as a leader in the mold of 'Abd an-Nasir and Saladin, Asad has a twofold goal: Arab unity and uncompromising struggle against Israel. The latter goal stems not only from Asad's need for legitimacy as an 'Alawi ruler of Syria, but also from his apparent conviction that Israel presents a significant threat to the integrity of the whole Arab nation.[12] He regards the confrontation with Israel as a zero-sum struggle; as a good strategist, he seeks to counterbalance Israeli military might with an all-Arab alliance.

After Egypt defected from this alliance following the 1973 war, Asad tried to establish an alternative alliance with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the PLO. Ba'thist Iraq posed grave problems (being eager for leadership in an Syria-Iraq union), so Asad turned to a Greater Syria alliance with Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO. During the second half of the 1970s he advanced cooperation with Jordan, extended his control over large parts of Lebanon, and, for a while, achieved a strategic alliance with the PLO. By March 1977 the noted British journalist Patrick Seale reported after an interview with Asad: "Asad saw Syria's immediate neighbors, Lebanon and Jordan, as a natural extension of its territory, vital to its defense. This three-nation grouping is already a fait accompli although in the low-key Asad manner without fanfare. Asad now rules by proxy in Lebanon, while the progressive integration with Jordan is well advanced. If the Palestinians ever recover a West Bank homeland, they too will inevitably join this complex."[13]

Asad also outlined his global strategy to Seale: "to forge an Arab bloc strong enough to become a regional power able to stand up to pressure from either of the superpowers."[14] Asad certainly has made significant strides in his relations with the great powers. He embarrassed the Soviet Union in 1974 by negotiating the Golan agreement

[10] Henry Kissinger, *The Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 779.

[11] Jimmy Carter, *The Blood of Abraham* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), p. 81.

[12] Damascus Radio, March 8, March 16, and July 24, 1972.

[13] Patrick Seale, as quoted in *Middle East Contemporary Survey* (1976-77), p. 616.

[14] *Observer* (London), March 6, 1977.

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with the United States; and in 1976 he ignored Soviet pressure and requests to refrain from invading Lebanon. Asad also renewed relations with United States. Both Nixon and Carter became his admirers. Nixon wrote in 1978: "This man really has elements of genius — he will be a leader to be reckoned with in this part of the world."[15] Carter referred to him as a "brilliant and strong man . . . the great leader of Syria."[16]

Asad enjoyed the praise of his own media too. *Al-Thawra*, one of Syria's official newspapers, concluded in June 1977: "These successes turned Asad into a star of the Arab homeland, and made Damascus a new power center — Asad became popular everywhere — he is the spokesman of the Arabs — Syria is a new dominant power in the Middle East — Asad now rides on two horses [the Soviet and the American]."[17]

Setbacks

But Asad's domestic, regional, and international achievements did not endure. Miscalculations and changed circumstances created problems. Direct intervention in Lebanon proved to be a grave error; the tactic of playing two rivals off against one another alienated both. The PLO distanced itself from Asad and consolidated its autonomous infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The Maronites, fearing Syrian domination, adopted guerrilla tactics against Syrian troops in Beirut and northern Lebanon.[18] While Syria was bogged down in Lebanon, Sadat undertook his initiative of November 1977, which led to the Camp David accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Iraq's war with Iran ruled out Iraqi participation in the struggle with Israel. King Husayn of Jordan pulled away from Asad in favor of Iraq.

By 1977, it became clear that Asad's nation-building and reforms had largely failed. Major problems included mismanagement and corruption in the government bureaucracy and the private economy; illiteracy and poor education, particularly in the rural areas, coupled with an increasing drain of professionals; and a growing trade deficit and inflation, a high cost of living, and shortages in consumer goods.[19] The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 aggravated the country's economic problems and fostered the spread of graft. Senior army officers (among them Rif'at al-Asad, the brother

[15] Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 1013-14.

[16] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (London: Collins, 1982) p. 286. See also William Quandt, *Camp David* (Washington: Brookings, 1986), p. 50.

[17] *Al-Thawra*, June 23, 1977.

[18] See Adeed Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1980); and R. Erlich, "Syria and the Lebanese Crisis" (M.A. thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1980) [in Hebrew].

[19] See *Tishrin* (Syria), November 18, 1977.

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of Hafiz) emerging as entrepreneurs smuggling contraband goods from Lebanon, reducing much government revenues while increasing corruption.

Even more threatening was the expansion of the Islamic opposition to Asad. Asad's support for the Christian Maronites and his military action against Muslims in Lebanon provoked an unprecedented spasm of Muslim resistance. This took the form of well-organized urban guerrilla warfare by the Muslim Brethren against officials and institutions associated with the regime. This campaign bordered on open rebellion from about 1979 to 1982.

Facing a serious threat to his regime and even to his life, Asad lost his famous cool self-confidence and reacted with fury.[20] He personally ordered a ferocious campaign of repression against the Muslim Brethren. Thousands were arrested and tortured; many were killed; and in February 1982, the rebellious city of Hama was bombed in an operation that may have killed as many as 30,000.[21]

Confronted with resistance from the Muslim Brethren and their many thousands of followers, as well as from urban professionals and intellectuals, Asad realized that his efforts to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Sunnis had failed. Even former Ba'th members regarded his regime as an illegitimate, 'Alawi-sectarian military dictatorship. Consequently, Asad increasingly turned to his strongest constituencies, peasants, workers, and the salaried middle-class, Sunni and non-Sunni alike, for support. The youth, who for a generation have been raised on notions about the goals of the Ba'th party as formulated by Asad, also show strong allegiance to Asad. These groups have occasionally been mobilized to support Asad's policies and to curb his domestic enemies.

Current Policies

The hard core of Asad's support base, however, is comprised of the 'Alawi community, the combat units of the Syrian army, and a wide network of security and intelligence organizations.

Officers loyal to Asad control the huge security, intelligence, and military apparatus of Asad's regime. They command about a dozen security and intelligence networks as well as the armored divisions and combat units. Asad directly controls the commanders of these forces, and they have been skillfully used to implement his policies. In addition to directing a state-run repression system against the Muslim Brethren in Syria, Syrian intelligence networks have undertaken special assignments against targets in the Middle East and Europe. Terrorism and intimidation extend Syrian control in Leba-

[20] See *Times* (London), April 2, 1980; *Guardian*, August 2, 1980; and *Al-Watan Al-Arab* (Paris), July 22, 1980.

[21] *Observer* (London), May 9, 1982; and *Amnesty International Report* (London: Amnesty International, 1983), pp. 36-37.

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non. For example, in 1977, Syrian agents assassinated Kamal Jumblat, the Druze leftist leader, and, in 1982, they killed Bashir Jumayyil, the newly elected Maronite president. By similar methods, Asad undid the 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Guerrilla warfare carried out by proxy indirectly caused the 1984 withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

Israel remains a major target of Asad's terrorist and guerrilla operations, not only in Lebanon but also in Europe. The attempt to bomb the El Al airplane in London in April 1986 and the attack on an El Al jet in Madrid in June 1986 are just two examples. This campaign of attrition, however, has merely been an auxiliary to Asad's major strategy of strategic balance with Israel. Asad developed the doctrine of strategic balance, or military parity, in the late 1970s when an isolated Syria was exposed to Israel. Asad determined to build a powerful military force in order to confront Israel without depending on neighboring Arab countries. The 1982 war with Israel in Lebanon strengthened this determination, and with massive aid from the Soviet Union, he succeeded in developing a large modern army. In addition to the latest in tanks and airplanes, Syria possesses long-range ground-to-ground missiles capable of launching chemical warheads into Israel.

Although still far from achieving military superiority over, or even a strategic balance with Israel, Asad has reached a rough military parity in quantitative terms. This allows him to deter Israel from attacking Syria, as well as to cause heavy losses to Israel in case of war. He may even have the resources necessary to regain the Golan, or part of it, by a surprise attack.

Asad's military power helps sustain his political gains. Having assumed the role of leader of the Arab struggle against Israel, he has succeeded in transforming Syria into a regional power in the Middle East, which will have a crucial impact on future developments. Asad has also succeeded in establishing a stable and strong regime in Syria and in improving the conditions of its underprivileged classes. Asad has gained these achievements by employing his unique skills as a leader, politician, and strategist. He has also used deceit, force, and terror to erect a brutal dictatorship and a police-state. The economy has been damaged and human rights suppressed. Even a lion is still a beast.

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SUDAN: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

by Samuel M. Makinda

Politics in the Sudan have changed dramatically since President Ja'far an-Numayri was overthrown by a military coup on April 6, 1985. Political parties, banned since 1969, operate again; Islamic law (the Shari'a), introduced in September 1983, is moderated; and the new leadership under Sadiq al-Mahdi appears to seek to change Sudan's foreign policy.

Numayri's foreign policy was pro-American, pro-Egyptian, and anti-Libyan. Today, while Khartoum seeks to maintain good terms with the United States, it has improved relations with Libya and allowed its alliance with Egypt to weaken. General 'Abd ar-Rahman Swareddahab, the first ruler after the coup (April 1985-April 1986), crafted the pro-Libyan policy; the Sadiq government, inaugurated in May 1986, appears intent on improving relations with all Sudan's neighbors.

Two problems remain almost unchanged since Numayri's days, the guerrilla war in South Sudan and the economic malaise. The Sadiq government's most difficult domestic task is to achieve a compromise between the Muslim north and the non-Muslim south, between fundamentalist and moderate Muslims, and between the military and civilians. Efforts by the Sadiq government to deal with these problems resemble the pouring of old wine into new bottles.

From Numayri to Swareddahab

The April 1985 coup occurred when things were going badly for Numayri. The economy was in its worst state since Numayri took power in a coup on May 25, 1969. War in the south had erupted again, and civil discontent was on the rise. Sudan seemed unstable, its direction increasingly uncertain.[1] General Swareddahab's coup was greeted with wide jubilation.

On rising to power in 1969, Numayri supported group leadership and espoused socialist aims. He had the support of several ideological groups ranging from Sudanese nationalists to Pan-Arabists. Elements of the dominant political parties, the Umma party and the National Unionist party, backed him. Only the Muslim Brethren openly chal-

[1] Most of these issues are discussed more extensively in S. Makinda, *The Coup in Sudan: Internal and International Implications* (Canberra: Legislative Research Service, Parliament of Australia, 1985).

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lenged Numayri, and its leaders were immediately arrested. Numayri had the strong support of the Sudanese Communist party, which expected to use him as a vehicle to bring Marxism to Sudan. But Numayri outsmarted them, exploiting this connection without allowing the Communists to attain their goals. Numayri's initial popularity reflected the public perception that he was untainted with corruption, responsive to the needs of the people, and above political factions.

The public's perception of Numayri changed before long. His ambition and unpredictability were a problem; a ruthless and suspicious man, he scrapped group leadership and established a dictatorial rule. Once a power base had been established, Numayri alienated all political factions and religious sects,[2] engaging in bloody confrontations with the Umma party, the National Unionist party, the Islamic Charter Front and other rightist groups in 1970. Following an abortive coup by leftists in July 1971, he confronted the Communists and beat them (Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi played a crucial role here). Numayri's ruthlessness forced some of his opponents into exile and alienated even his advisers.

Ironically, all these shifts in policy and personnel increased Numayri's insecurity. And with good reason; during his sixteen years of rule, he survived twelve attempted coups.

In the late 1970s, supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia, Numayri engaged in a policy of "national reconciliation" — an effort to bring his opponents home from exile and into the government. He initially sought to encourage Sadiq al-Mahdi and Hasan at-Turabi (of the Islamic Charter Front) to return. They did so in 1977; Turabi eventually joined Numayri's government, but Sadiq remained in opposition. Not all the exiled leaders came back; Sharif Husayn al-Hindi of the National Unionist party dismissed Numayri's reconciliation offer as a ploy and remained in exile. And Numayri's reconciliation excluded most opposition groups.[3]

Numayri launched the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) in 1972 in an effort to make his regime less military. All political parties had been banned in 1969, so the SSU was the only legal party in Sudan; accordingly, most Sudanese politicians operated through it. The SSU served as Numayri's main political support by the mid-1970s. It offered opportunities for advancement for his supporters but, clearly, his efforts to create a mass party had failed.[4] Numayri systematically undermined any politician who offered an alternative leadership; he

[2] See, for instance, Peter Woodward, "Sudan After Numayri," *Third World Quarterly*, October 1985, pp. 958-72.

[3] For a good analysis of Numayri's policies of reconciliation, see Mohammed Beshir Hamid, "Confrontation and Reconciliation Within an African Context: The Case of Sudan," *Third World Quarterly*, April 1983, pp. 320-29.

[4] See, for instance, Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1982-83* (London and New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1984), pp. B70-90.

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weakened the independence of the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the civil service; and he brought state security under his personal control.

Numayri's dictatorship did not completely eliminate the various factions in Sudanese politics; but he controlled them by playing one faction off against another. He used Communists to fight the traditional parties in 1970; then he relied on Pan-Arabists to destroy Communists, southerners to fend off northern opposition groups; and fundamentalist Muslims against everyone else. By the time Numayri fell from power, he had alienated even the fundamentalist Muslims, including his former attorney general and foreign affairs adviser, Hasan at-Turabi.

Numayri's successor, General Swareddahab chaired a Transitional Military Council which served as his primary power base. He used the civilian-dominated cabinet, established on April 22, 1985, to appease the various groups that had generated the pressure leading to Numayri's overthrow. Swareddahab tried to balance interests in selecting his cabinet, but northerners and southerners both complained about its composition. He established a human rights charter guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, the civil service, trade unions, the media, universities, and the police. A new constitution came into force following the general elections of April 1986. When the time came to hand power over following the general elections, Swareddahab dissolved the Transitional Military Council and ceded power to Sadiq al-Mahdi's elected government.

The Sadiq al-Mahdi Regime

Not just the leader of the Umma party; Sadiq al-Mahdi is also the religious leader of the Ansar sect of Islam and a former prime minister (having served in 1966-67). Sadiq's task was clear: balance moderate Muslims against fundamentalists, provide effective leadership; keep the army in the barracks, improve the economy, bring large sections of the population back into the political process, and resolve the crisis in southern Sudan.

The April 1986 general elections appeared to present Sadiq with a mandate, but he is likely to find it difficult to govern effectively. Elections had to be cancelled in thirty-seven of the sixty-eight constituencies in rebel-controlled southern Sudan, so a majority of the six million southerners are not represented. Turabi's National Islamic Front (i.e., the Muslim Brethren) was more popular than Sadiq's Umma party in the critical urban areas (especially Khartoum) and among the educated elite; its many representatives will probably make matters difficult for Sadiq. The Umma party had to form a coalition government with the Democratic Unionist party and five small southern parties, further diminishing Sadiq's ability to pursue his own agenda.

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Sadiq needs to address the role of Islamic law. A close alliance has developed over the years between secular political parties and religious elements. Sadiq's Umma party has close links to the Ansar sect, a group started by followers of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi — Sadiq's great-grandfather — the nineteenth-century religious leader who revolted against the British and Egyptian occupation of Sudan. The Democratic Unionist party draws most of its support from the pro-Egyptian Khatmiya sect, founded by Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani. The National Islamic Front is based on the Muslim Brethren, the organization of fundamentalist Muslims which had a key role in implementing Islamic law from September 1983.

A word on the Islamic law, which has a great symbolic role in Sudanese politics: Numayri introduced Islamic law when his government was under political pressure; it was clearly intended to bring him various benefits. The law would divert the public's attention from deteriorating living conditions,[5] win support from the Muslim Brethren,[6] and attract economic assistance from Saudi Arabia. Sadiq opposed Numayri's application of Islamic law on the grounds that it should be adapted to modern circumstances.[7] As a result, he was detained by Numayri from late 1983 until December 1984.

The Umma party advocates the scrapping of Islamic law; but its principal coalition partner, the Democratic Unionist party, calls for applying a modified version of the law. Many secular Muslims and some Christians voted for the Umma party believing that Sadiq represents the only hope against the National Islamic Front.[8] But Sadiq cannot govern effectively without the support of the Democratic Unionist Party and does not want to alienate the fundamentalists, so the laws are likely to be preserved, at least in a modified form.

Sadiq has had inconsistent views on the multi-party system over the years. He indicated a preference for a one-party system before Numayri's 1969 coup, in part because inter-party rivalries toppled coalition governments in the 1960s. In the recent past, however, he has supported the multi-party system. The danger is that the system is likely to create problems resembling those of two decades ago. Moreover, the new constitution makes the five-member Supreme Council, headed by Ahmad al-Mirghani of the Democratic Unionist party, the effective head of state. Designed to guard against the assumption of absolute power by one individual, this arrangement is likely to make governing very difficult.

[5] Peter Woodward, "Sudan: Threats to Stability," *Conflict Studies*, No. 173, p. 7.

[6] Some members of the Sudanese Muslim Brethren are quite liberal on many social issues, but those charged with implementing the Shari'a under Numayri were the fundamentalist group within the Brethren.

[7] For a good discussion of Sadiq's views on this issue, see Alexander S. Cudsi, "Islam and Politics in Sudan," in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 51-55.

[8] See "The New National Umma Party Wins Election in Sudan," *Arabia: The Islamic World Review*, May 1986, p. 28.

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The rivalries to come might again bring in the military to supply effective leadership. Indeed, the Sadiq government has to deal very carefully with the military establishment; after all, the army was split on the question of handing power over to civilians in April 1986.

Economic Issues

Sadiq's greatest internal challenges are the economy and the southern insurgency. Sudan has no major industry and no natural resources except oil. (The oil, discovered in 1979, is projected to yield 50,000 barrels per day for eighteen years; but guerrilla fighting in southern Sudan prevents its exploitation.) Agriculture contributes more than 40 percent of the gross domestic product, accounts for over 90 percent of exports, and employs more than 80 percent of the economically active population.

Agricultural problems in recent years have undermined the entire economy. The drought that has parched East and Central Africa since 1982 has had especially serious consequences in Sudan because so much of the country's food production depends on rain. More than four million Sudanese farmers have been affected. Most families cannot grow enough food for themselves (the food deficit in 1986 exceeded one million tons of grain), so the government imports large quantities of grain at great cost. This not only pushes up prices, but prompts an exodus from rural areas to the cities. Numayri aggravated the situation by increasing bread prices by 33 percent in March 1985. Foreign aid agencies predict that many Sudanese will face starvation this year.

On top of the drought and famine, Sudan is burdened by more than a million refugees from Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The problem is alarming; social amenities are lacking in most places, sanitary conditions are poor, and the pressure of feeding ever increasing newcomers has forced the drought-stricken Sudanese to live in the midst of steadily worsening squalor.

Cotton, Sudan's most important export crop, has also dropped. Production is plagued by outdated equipment, poor management, inadequate infrastructure, short-sighted pricing policies, and rampant corruption. Moreover, this major export crop, which requires intensive labor at picking time, faces a decline in workers as starving people leave the cotton growing regions in search of food.

The unfavorable balance of trade has worsened Sudan's foreign debt, which exceeds $10 billion. This debt resulted partly from Numayri's attempts to achieve economic growth through large-scale borrowing. The development projects he envisioned were held back because of inadequate infrastructure, and improving the infrastructure meant more borrowing. The government eventually tried to reschedule foreign debts, but Sudan still devotes 80 percent of its

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foreign exchange earnings to service debts. This leaves very little money for development.

Sudan's enormous debt problem compelled the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to intervene in the country's financial management. The IMF and some Western creditors demanded severe belt-tightening measures as a condition for additional aid. In February 1986, after a failure to meet a deadline on interest payments, the IMF declared Sudan ineligible for further loans.[9] Unfortunately, some IMF prescriptions have worsened the situation, such as the recommendation to devalue the currency. Numayri regularly relied on this tactic in the face of increasing imports and declining exports (due to underproduction, not over-pricing), only making the situation worse.

The United States has given huge amounts of aid; after Egypt, Sudan is the largest recipient of American assistance in Africa — more than $1 billion in economic and military assistance between 1979 and 1985.[10] Sadiq's favorable outlook toward the United States and Saudi Arabia, Sudan's two major donors, might help him in the search for more economic assistance. But Sudan's economic problems are so many and so complex that foreign assistance has had little effect; ultimately, the solution must come from within.

Rumblings in the South

Sadiq's other urgent problem is the guerrilla war in the south. Resolution of the southern question requires major concessions by the guerrilla forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the government in Khartoum. Progress towards a solution was held back in 1985 by differences between the Transitional Military Council and the cabinet. Swareddahab sent emissaries to Colonel John Garang, leader of the SPLA; undertook missions to Ethiopia and Libya; and wanted to organize a national referendum on the situation in the south, but to no avail.

The animosity between north and south stems from ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. The south, a predominantly Christian region, with some animists, comprises many ethnic groups. The north is largely Muslim by religion and Arabic in culture. For over a century, northerners have tried to impose their rule on the southerners, who respond with resentment.[11]

Southern complaints of neglect, stagnation, lack of influence, and northern domination led to the outbreak of civil war between the southern *Anyanya* guerrillas and the central government shortly

[9] *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic series), February 1986, p. 8089.

[10] See *Sudan: Problems and Prospects*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 28, 1984, p. 3.

[11] For a good analysis of Sudan's cleavages, see Ali A. Mazrui, *Violence and Thought* (London: Longmans, 1969), pp. 163-83.

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after independence in 1956. More than half a million people died in this conflict. Numayri gained first-hand experience of the south's problems while serving as a soldier; he then brought the civil war to an end in 1972. He met with the guerrilla leader Joseph Lagu in Addis Ababa in March 1972 and signed a peace agreement guaranteeing regional autonomy to the south.

From 1972 the south increased its role in national affairs and the former *Anyanya* guerrillas joined the Sudanese army and the police. By the mid-1970s the south had become a crucial power-base for Numayri. But the situation then changed. Some northerners criticized the south's failure to attract investment and the region's corruption. Southern politicians lost their influence in national politics as Numayri's reconciliation brought hostile northern politicians into the government. Southerners complained of economic discrimination by the central government; even the large projects in the south, such as the oil exploration and the Jonglei canal, were seen as benefiting the north.[12]

These changes in attitude coincided with Numayri's 1981 efforts to achieve administrative devolution by establishing regional governments throughout Sudan. These gave rise to many problems in the north, as politicians there complained that their regions were much smaller than those in the south. Possibly in response to this and other complaints, Numayri redivided the south in May 1983, and in so doing violated the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. The three new provinces (the Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria) were administered from Khartoum, spurring bitter resentment among southerners.[13]

Numayri's handling of Chevron's discovery of an oil field at Bentiu in the south in 1979 further inflamed the situation. Southerners called for building an oil refinery at Bentiu to stimulate the economy of their region. Numayri proposed building the refinery at Kosti in the north. Then he changed his mind and announced a pipeline to connect the south directly to the Red Sea for the export of crude oil. Fearing that they would receive little revenue from what they saw as their oil, southerners were enraged. They interpreted these moves as part of a deliberate northern plan to split their ranks, create disunity, and oppress them.

These issues — the introduction of Islamic law, the subdivision of the south, and the deprivation of oil revenues — convinced some southerners to take up arms to regain their autonomy. They became guerrillas, first of *Anyanya II* which seeks secession, and later of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, which aims to unite Sudan under a socialist government run by southerners. The SPLA is headed by

[12] See Andrew Mawson, "Southern Sudan: A Growing Conflict," *The World Today*, December 1984, p. 522.

[13] See Mawson, "Southern Sudan: A Growing Conflict," pp. 520-27.

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the American-educated John Garang, a former officer in the Sudanese army; its political wing is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLA, which controls most of southern Sudan, has stepped up its activities since early 1984, including the destruction of communication links and the kidnapping of foreign workers. It forced Chevron to suspend oil-drilling at Bentiu. In August 1986, the SPLA shot down a civilian aircraft carrying relief supplies and killed all sixty people on board.

Since 1985, Khartoum has not been able to resolve the southern conflict. On April 18, 1985, Swareddahab offered to cancel the decree subdividing the south into three separate regions, and a month later he established a transitional cabinet to administer southern Sudan. He also planned a referendum for early 1986 to determine an administrative system for the region. He professed willingness to implement the self-rule provisions of the 1972 Addis Ababa accord. But Garang and the SPLA rejected Swareddahab's arrangements, accusing him of reuniting the three regions into a "super region" under a "mini military council similar to that in Khartoum."

Sadiq continued these efforts. He met with Garang on July 31, 1986, and his envoys have held several talks with the SPLA. Sadiq agreed in principle to restore autonomy to the south, cancelled the oil pipeline plan, and promised to build an oil refinery in southern Sudan. To ensure equitable representation in his administration, Sadiq included southerners in his cabinet; their parties, however, have no influence on the SPLA guerrillas.

The Libyan-Ethiopian Factor

The situation in the south will improve only after Garang and his supporters agree to support Sadiq's government; and this will occur only if Libya and Ethiopia push him in this direction. Accordingly Sudan's regional policy under Swareddahab and Sadiq has become far more friendly to Libya and Ethiopia. These two, in turn, have taken advantage of the changes in Sudan to improve their leverage on Khartoum. Thus, Qadhdhafi has visited Sudan twice since Numayri's overthrow.

Qadhdhafi had differed with Numayri on many issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Chad war, and the Horn of Africa. These policy differences prompted Qadhdhafi to support any organization that opposed Numayri, a situation that made the Sudanese leader see Qadhdhafi as his most dangerous enemy. Qadhdhafi recognized Swareddahab's government immediately and soon the two states restored full diplomatic relations. Other steps followed. In July 1985, Libya began providing logistical and training help for the Sudanese armed forces. Sadiq visited Libya in April 1986, just a few weeks before becoming prime minister.

The Libyan-Sudanese friendship, however, is unlikely to last long. Sudan's major political parties are rooted in religious sects, and

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no major religious sect is pro-Libyan. Qadhdhafi does not usually maintain durable relations with leaders who differ with him and Sadiq, a political veteran, is not likely to defer to Qadhdhafi on issues of importance to Sudan. Also many Sudanese political groupings question Libyan intentions. Some believe that Qadhdhafi has been insincere in trying to end the conflict in southern Sudan, giving Khartoum two Tupolev aircraft while continuing to arm the guerrillas. This said, Sadiq's government comprises factions that seek good relations with Libya. Sadiq, therefore, must balance their interests with his generally pro-Western and pro-Egyptian policies.

Ethiopian-Sudanese problems go back for many years and are driven by two main issues: the Eritrean question and southern Sudan. Most Eritrean guerrillas fighting for independence from Ethiopia have bases in Sudan, and this upsets Ethiopia's relations with Sudan. At the same time, southern Sudanese fighters operate from bases in Ethiopia. Each of the two has on occasion tried to destabilize the other by means of these guerrilla forces. Relations improved briefly in 1972 when the two countries signed an agreement covering both Eritrea and southern Sudan, whereby each promised not to aid dissidents in the other's country. But Ethiopia was involved in the July 2, 1976, coup attempt against Numayri, and this again strained relations. Another attempted rapprochement in 1980 collapsed by early 1983. Swareddahab sent envoys to Addis Ababa in June 1985. After a three day visit, the two countries agreed to resume full diplomatic relations and Ethiopia vowed to end its support for the SPLA. Sadiq has promised to reciprocate with regard to the Eritreans. But old habits die hard; despite these public pledges, both states appear still to be aiding the other's guerrillas.

In addition to Libya and Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen) gave Numayri cause for worry. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the PDRY ruler from April 1980 to January 1986, was quite close to Qadhdhafi and Mengistu. The three appear to have been coordinating their policies from 1980. This tacit alignment became evident in August 1981 when they met in Aden to sign a security pact.[14] Numayri charged this pro-Soviet alliance of trying to overthrow him. Future PDRY relations with Sudan will depend mostly on Sadiq's readiness to extend friendship to Aden.

The Egyptian and Saudi Connections

Sudanese relations with Egypt have historically been built on an understanding that neither country interfere with the flow of the Nile River. Accordingly, Egyptian leaders display anxiety when politics in Sudan are in turmoil.

The two countries signed a mutual defense pact in July 1976 and a charter of integration in October 1982 (pledging to unite by

[14] See *Newsweek*, September 7, 1981, p. 18.

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1992). The charter establishes a Higher Council headed by the two presidents, a Nile Valley Parliament, a general secretariat and a joint development fund. In addition to these formal declarations, the two states supported each other diplomatically and Egypt maintained a military presence in Sudan most of the time since 1976.

Numayri's close identification with Egypt made his overthrow a source of anxiety for Cairo. Sudan was one of but three Arab League members (along with Oman and Somalia) to support the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Consequently, Egyptian relations with Sudan were very cordial. The Sudanese and Egyptian governments also shared an anti-Qadhdhafi policy; thus, Egypt deployed more than 2,000 troops to Sudan after the Libyan bombing of Sudan's largest city, Omdurman, in March 1984.

In the early 1980s, Egyptian leaders came to see some of Numayri's policies as a political liability. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak publicly indicated his disfavor when Islamic law was introduced in September 1983, in part out of fear that Islamic law in Sudan would encourage fundamentalist Muslims in Egypt.[15] Egyptian leaders appeared relieved when General Swareddahab, who was reportedly known for pro-Egyptian sympathies, toppled Numayri.[16]

Then came a series of mixed signals. After taking power in April 1985, Swareddahab quickly assured Egyptian leaders that Sudan would remain friendly to Egypt. In mid-May, the *Saudi Gazette* quoted Sudanese prime minister Daf'alla as saying that Sudan would abrogate all bilateral agreements with Egypt. Deputy Prime Minister Samuel Bol, followed soon after with a statement that Sudan sought good ties with Egypt while improving those with Libya. Foreign Minister Ibrahim Taha Ayyub then reassured Egypt that Sudan intended to maintain good relations. On March 30, 1986, the Swareddahab cabinet recommended that all institutions erected under the integration charter be dissolved. Sadiq would like to maintain close relations with Egypt, but he will not adopt Numayri's anti-Libyan policy to do it.

Mubarak's decision to grant Numayri asylum was one complicating factor. The new Sudanese rulers repeatedly requested Numayri's extradition to face trial in Sudan, but the Egyptian government fell back on its country's tradition of providing safe haven for political exiles.

From the mid-1970s Numayri tried to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia, chiefly to obtain aid. Saudi Arabia's interest in Sudan stems

[15] See David B. Ottaway, "Numayri's Behavior Worries Egypt," *International Herald Tribune*, June 9-10, 1984, pp. 1-2.

[16] Judith Miller, "Egypt Pleased as Sudan Pledges," *New York Times*, April 8, 1985, p. 6; and "Mubarak Reaffirms His Support for New Regime," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), April 10, 1985, p. 2.

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from religious, strategic, and economic factors. Saudi leaders see their country as a bastion of Islamic values and the protector of the holy places of Mecca and Medina; as such, they feel obliged to help other Muslims, especially conservative Arabs.[17] As a politically fragile, pro-Western state, Saudi Arabia fears encirclement by pro-Soviet regimes and seeks to keep the Red Sea shores in friendly hands. As consumers of imported food, the Saudis seek nearby sources of grain. For all these reasons, Riyadh helped Numayri. And so too do they wish the new Sudanese leadership success.

Sadiq appears to have an understanding with Iraq. It is believed that the Iraqi Ba'th party had a significant role in getting the Umma and the Democratic Unionist parties to cooperate against the National Islamic Front. Apparently, Saddam Husayn feared that a victory for fundamentalist Muslims would move Sudan closer to Iran.

The United States

Although the Sadiq government appears to want close relations with the United States, these relations will be affected by a host of factors in coming years. These include Sudan's relations with its neighbors, including Libya; the country's worsening economic situation; the insurgency in southern Sudan; Middle East problems; and access to Sudanese military facilities by the U.S. Central Command.

Although nominally nonaligned, Sudan has had closer relations with the United States than with the Soviet Union since 1976. From 1977, when Numayri expelled Soviet military advisers and terminated all military ties with Moscow, Khartoum became dependent on Washington for military and economic assistance. In 1980 it allowed the Rapid Deployment Force (renamed U.S. Central Command in 1983) access to military facilities. Sudan participated in American military exercises in the Persian Gulf region between 1981 and 1984.

Numayri, however, was not an American puppet. He effectively exploited the communist "threat" as a means of obtaining aid from the United States, especially after 1981. He knew that the quickest way to receive American military assistance was to raise alarms about a Libyan invasion a few weeks before the Congress debated administration requests for aid to sub-Saharan Africa. He successfully played this game in March 1981, February 1983, and March 1984; in the last case the United States even sent two AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to Egypt to monitor the Sudanese situation.[18]

American interests in Sudan are strategic. Washington regards its policy in Sudan (and northeast Africa as a whole) in terms of the

[17] William B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 43-45.

[18] See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. And Egypt Consider Airlift of Arms to Sudan," *New York Times*, March 18, 1984, p. 1.

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Middle East and the power struggle with Moscow. Sudan's importance to the United States lies in its geographic location. Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, told a congressional committee in April 1983: "Our strategic interests in the Horn of Africa are strictly corollary to our broader interests in Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean, and our military activity in the Horn . . . is directed at protecting these larger interests."[19] Those interests include access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and the security of the sea routes through the region.[20] A 1982 congressional report argued that Sudan stood "as a constraining factor against radical Libya . . . against Communist Ethiopia . . . and as a haven of moderation for refugees."[21]

Internal problems in Sudan and realignments in the regional equation suggest that U.S. diplomacy must readjust to accommodate the changes. The decision for good relations with Libya — quite reasonable keeping in mind the situation in southern Sudan — caused "grave concern" in Washington. But American assistance on its own cannot help a Sudanese leader resolve the southern Sudan problem; he needs Ethiopian and Libyan pressure on the SPLA. The most appropriate line of action for the United States would be not to concentrate on Libya's ties to Sudan but to concentrate on the long-term mutual interests of Washington and Khartoum.

[19] *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1984*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1983), p. 304.

[20] See, for example, *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*, Report by the Congressional Research Service for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 1979 (Revised March 16, 1982), pp. 2, 88-93.

[21] *United States Economic Assistance to Egypt and Sudan*, Reports of Staff Study Missions to Egypt and Sudan to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1982, p. 40.

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Documentation

LEFT AND RIGHT IN EASTERN EUROPE

by Michael Shafir

For many years now, in order to overcome the absence, unreliability, or secrecy surrounding opinion polling in Eastern Europe on sensitive political issues, Radio Free Europe's (RFE) Audience and Public Opinion Research Department has been polling tourists and visitors to the West. Its numerous studies have been validated by surveys conducted inside Eastern Europe itself on the rare occasions when such sensitive surveys were made public. The tables that follow present the results of one inquiry, namely that of East European political self-assessments. The findings offer unusual information about a virtually unknown topic.

This study is based on interviews conducted between June 1984 and March 1985 with a representative sample of 6,282 respondents from Eastern Europe. The respondents were all visitors to the West who intended to return to their countries. The survey was conducted by independent Western public opinion research institutes. The Research Department uses the Comparative and Continual Sampling Method devised by Henry O. Hart.[1] The results of this survey are then compared to a similar study conducted in 1977-78.

Left-Center-Right Identification

The interviewees were asked the following question: "In political matters, people talk about left and right. How would you place your views on this scale?" A scale of ten points, with Point 1 labeled "Left" and Point 10 labeled "Right" was used. Previous surveys [2] had demonstrated that East European respondents encountered no difficulty in assessing themselves in terms of this continuum, and this was supported by the responses in the present samples. All together, 6

[1] See Henry O. Hart, "The Method of Comparative and Continual Sampling," *Communications*, No. 4, 1978, pp. 201-19.

[2] See Radio Free Europe, East European Area, Audience and Opinion Research, "East Europeans Position Themselves and Radio Free Europe on the Left-Right Political Continuum," April 1977; and "The Political Self-Assessment of Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish Respondents in Relation to West European Self-Assessment (Part I) and Hypothetical Party Preferences (Part II)," April 1979.

Michael Shafir is Deputy Director of Audience and Opinion Research for the East European Area of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

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TABLE 1
POLITICAL SELF-ASSESSMENT ON A LEFT-RIGHT CONTINUUM

	%
Left	7
Center	68
Right	25

percent of the East Europeans questioned in the present survey failed to assess themselves in terms of the Left-Right continuum. That figure is on the same order as the "No answer" returns to similar survey questions administered to West Europeans in 1973.[3] This study covers only those 5,922 respondents who were willing to identify themselves in terms of the scale.

For the purpose of the study, respondents who opted for points 1 to 3 on the continuum are considered as left-wing, those who opted for points 4 to 7 as centrist and those for points 8 to 10 as right-wing. As used here, the terms left-wing and right-wing are loosely descriptive.

Close to seven in ten of the 5,922 respondents saw themselves as centrist and a significant minority (one in four) identified with the Right. This left a minority of 7 percent willing to identify with the Left.

In all five countries covered by the survey, large majorities, ranging from 62 percent to 74 percent, opted to assess their political views as centrist. Nevertheless, as table 2 shows, significant differences were registered among the national sub-samples in terms of identification with the opposing poles of the continuum. The Bulgarians were the strongest in supporting the Left, and the Poles strongest in supporting the Right.

The proportion of Poles who assessed themselves as Left was less than half of the (very small) proportion registered for Eastern Europe as a whole. Self-assessment in terms of the Right was significantly more pronounced in the Polish national sub-sample than else-

TABLE 2
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SELF-ASSESSMENT ON A LEFT-RIGHT CONTINUUM

	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Bulgaria	All but Poland
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Left	9	8	3	6	18	9
Center	70	74	62	74	65	72
Right	21	18	35	20	17	19

[3] Ranging from 6 percent (Dutch respondents) to 28 percent (Belgian respondents). See "The Political Self-Assessment of Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish Respondents." As indicated by Henry O. Hart, similarity of results obtained from comparing findings based on the method of Comparative and Continual Sampling with large-scale random survey results based on samples of West Europeans is further evidence of the representatives of the sample. On the other hand, when differences between East and West results is expected, they are generally found too. See Hart, "The Method of Comparative and Continual Sampling," p. 204.

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TABLE 3

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SELF-ASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF A LEFT-RIGHT CONTINUUM: NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

	Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Romania		Poland	
	1977/78	1984/85	1977/78	1984/85	1977/78	1984/85	1977/78	1984/85
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Left	12	9	7	8	5	6	19	3
Center	72	70	79	74	80	74	62	62
Right	16	21	14	18	13	20	19	35
No. of Cases	1,052	1,333	1,162	1,212	602	1,217	1,553	1,424

where in Eastern Europe. In fact, the returns of the Polish sample heavily influenced the East European average, as the "All but Poland" figures in table 2 indicate.

Table 3 shows that in 1984-85 the proportion of Poles who opted for the Left of the political continuum had decreased dramatically. The very large decline of sixteen percentage points in those identifying with the Left was exactly matched by those identifying with the Right (no change was registered in centrist self-assessment). In the other East European countries, a noticeable and telling trend for centrists to move towards the Right was observed between 1977-78 and 1984-85. However, the gains of the Right nowhere else approach those registered in Poland. What is more, it is only in the Polish case that the Right makes its dramatic gains at the expense of the Left, rather than the Center. Since none of the other East European subsamples produce such radical shifts, it is very probable that the changes in the Polish results are a reaction to the events of December 1981.

The stronger Bulgarian propensity for the Left end of the spectrum is probably the outcome of a combination of two main factors. First, unlike its counterparts in Romania, Hungary, or Poland, the Bulgarian Left is not associated with one of the nation's traditional historical enemies (Russia). Furthermore, recent Bulgarian history does not include instances of Soviet "brotherly help," likely to destroy traditional sympathies towards Russia, as in Czechoslovakia's case. Second, identification with the Left may partially be the outcome of satisfaction with the regime's economic performance.[4]

Party Preference

In order to determine whether self-assessment in terms of a Left-Right continuum should be employed as an analytical tool, the respondents' self-assessments were checked against their party pref-

[4] See S. White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," *World Politics*, April 1986, pp. 462-82. The poor performance of the Bulgarian economy only became apparent towards the end of the survey period. Earlier, Bulgaria's economic performance — particularly in the agricultural sector, had appeared impressive. See *PlanEcon Report*, Volume 1, Number 13, 1985; Wharton Econometric Forecasting: Centrally Planned Economies Services, Volume VI, Numbers 3 and 15, 1986 and *Sudost Europa*, Volume 35, Number 1, 1986, pp. 67-77.

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TABLE 4

SELF-ASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF A LEFT-RIGHT CONTINUUM AND PARTY PREFERENCE IN A HYPOTHETICAL FREE ELECTION

	Communist	Democratic-Socialist	Christian Democratic	Peasant	Conservative
	%	%	%	%	%
Left	56	6	1	5	1
Center	43	75	69	73	49
Right	1	19	30	22	50
No. of Cases*	317	2,135	1,979	625	584

* 282 respondents did not reply to this question.

erences in a hypothetical free election. Table 4 demonstrates that when offered a choice of voting for one of five different parties in a free election, the sample provided evidence of consistency.[5] That is, abstract perceptions ("Left," "Right") conform to views on specific political issues.

Almost no potential Communist party or Conservative party voters identified with the end of the political spectrum opposite to their views. A majority of Communists viewed themselves as belonging to the Left, but a significant minority, more than two in five, assessed themselves as centrist. This may follow from the association of such pejoratives as "leftist deviationism," "Maoism," or "Trotskyism" with the Left.

One in two potential Conservative voters identified with the Right. Identification with the Center was nonetheless almost equally frequent. However, it should be emphasized that potential Conservative voters were considerably less inclined to view themselves as centrist than were other supporters of non-Communist parties. In Eastern Europe, conservatism is often identified with the traditional, rather than with the revolutionary, Right. Therefore, a Conservative party would be perceived by many as belonging to the Center, while a fascist or proto-fascist movement would occupy the extreme right of the spectrum. It should also be pointed out that in countries such as Poland or Czechoslovakia, the tie between the extreme right and Nazi Germany must make it difficult for many to associate the Right with democracy. In the case of Romania, the government's unceasing nationalist campaigns may have cultivated reluctance to identify with the Right, which historically has been generally perceived as nationalistic. What might be at work here is the typical East European display of mistrust towards the regime's handling of information, otherwise known as "if it's in the paper, it can't be true."[6] Viewed

[5] The project on hypothetical free elections in Eastern Europe was initiated by Henry O. Hart and has been producing consistent results over the years. See Henry O. Hart, "The Tables Turned: If East Europeans Could Vote," *Public Opinion*, October-November 1983, pp. 53-57.

[6] See S. Sampson, "Rumours in Socialist Romania," *Survey*, Winter 1984.

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from this perspective, the growth in rightist self-assessment between 1977-78 and 1984-85, though relatively small (see table 3) is all the more significant.

Radio Listenership

Listening to Western stations provides a good link between self-assessment and actual political behavior. Logically, those who stand with the regimes probably seldom look for other sources of information, while those of a contrary political persuasion are likely to do so. Table 5 shows just such linkage.

TABLE 5

SELF-ASSESSMENT IN TERMS OF A LEFT-RIGHT CONTINUUM AND LISTENERSHIP TO WESTERN BROADCASTS

	Non-Listeners	Listeners to Western Stations other than RFE	RFE Listeners
	%	%	%
Left	21	7	8
Center	71	72	66
Right	9	21	31
No. of Cases	989	1,558	3,380

Of those who do not listen to any Western broadcasts, one in ten identifies with the Right and twice as many identify with the Left; seven in ten see themselves as centrist — a proportion almost identical to that registered among listeners to Western stations other than RFE and only somewhat higher than that among RFE listeners. Taken at face value, these findings suggest an absence of linkage between Left-Center-Right identification and actual political behavior as illustrated by listening to Western stations. However, it should be borne in mind that those whose political leanings contradict the regime's credo may be among the large group of non-listeners who face objective impediments to listening to Western stations, such as jamming (except in Hungary and Romania, where RFE is not jammed), unsuitable radio sets, or poor reception.

Those who do listen to Western broadcasts provide a clearer picture of linkage between political self-assessment and political practice. The five-nation sample demonstrates that the more strongly the respondents disagree with the regime, the more likely they are to tune in to Western broadcasts, and vice-versa. Table 5 indicates that self-assessment with the Right increases in direct proportion to listening to Western stations; further, more RFE listeners (about one in three) incline more to the Right than do listeners of other Western stations (about one in five). Centrists diminish in proportion as one goes from non-listeners or listeners to other Western stations to RFE listeners. The proportion of leftists thins out rapidly running from non-listeners to RFE listeners.

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DISSENT IN THE GORBACHEV ERA

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

The documents that follow deal with developments in Eastern and Central Europe since Mikhail Gorbachev launched the glasnost *campaign. As might be expected, dissident intellectuals view the Soviet cultural thaw as an opportunity to drop dogmas long cherished by Moscow. With reason, many of them consider what is now happening in Moscow a vindication of their views. Yesterday's heresy has become today's* Pravda *editorial.*

But if Andrei Sakharov, who never broke totally with the Soviet regime, voices the hopes and dreams of the "loyalist" opposition to the government, dissidents elsewhere in the Soviet bloc confront more difficult choices. They cannot count, as he does, on the benevolence of factions within the Communist party. Controls remain tight and critical voices unwelcome. For the time being, the Gorbachop (as The Economist *refers to the Soviet leader's anti-bureaucratic methods) does not seem to affect Eastern Europe's aging tyrants. They pay lip service to reforms and continue to harass their critics. Gorbachev embodies the avant-garde of change within the system; leaders like Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak, and East Germany's Erich Honecker prefer to retain the old methods. They undermine the Soviet leader's injunctions and act as though they hope these will go away.*

Dissidents rejoice at tensions between governments and take advantage of their new opportunities. The October 23, 1986, joint statement of dissidents from four Soviet-bloc countries — Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland — suggests a heightened awareness of the new room to maneuver. The statement indicates a belief that the region is not paralyzed, that things can change, that citizens should rebel against injustice. The significance of this appeal can hardly be exaggerated. It is the first time that dissidents from East-Central Europe have issued a joint statement pointing to their common values and objectives. Its impact was further enhanced by the decision of three Romanian dissidents to sign it after learning of its publication from Western broadcasts.

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Dissidents Issue Communiqué on 1956 Events[1]

[Joint communiqué signed by Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and East German dissidents adopted October 23, 1986]

Thirty years ago, on October 23, 1956, workers, students, and soldiers launched an attack on the Budapest radio station building because they had enough of official lies and wanted to hear the truth and express their own demands. They destroyed the statue of Stalin and the credibility of a regime which claimed to represent the dictatorship of the proletariat and the people's republic. Their struggle showed clearly that what the Hungarian people really wanted was independence, democracy and neutrality. They wanted to live in peace in a decent and free society.

The Hungarian revolution as well as the East Berlin uprising, the Prague Spring, and the social movement of the free trade union Solidarity in Poland were suppressed, either by Soviet intervention or by local armed intervention. During the past 30 years, life has become easier for many people, and some can express themselves without being thrown into prison. But the essential demands of the revolutionaries have not been satisfied.

On this anniversary, we call on all our friends in the world to join us to commemorate the 1956 Hungarian revolution. We proclaim our common determination to struggle for political democracy in our countries, for their independence, for pluralism founded on the principles of self-government, for the peaceful unification of a divided Europe and for its democratic integration, as well as for the rights of all national minorities. We emphasize our mutual reliance on the efforts of all of us to achieve, in our countries and in the whole world, a better life that is free and decent. The tradition and the experiences of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 remain our common heritage and our inspiration.

Berlin, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, October 23, 1986.
List of Signatories

Hungary: Ivan Baba, Antal Bogar, Peter Bokros, Geza Buda, Sandor Csoori, Istvan Csurka, Gabor Demszky, Olga Dioszegi, Arpad Gonez, Bela Gondos, Judit Gyenes, Aliz Halda, Miklos Haraszti, Janos Kenedi, Zsolt Keszthelyi, Janos Kis, Karoly Kiszely, Csaba Konczol, Gyorgy Konrad, Ferenc Koszeg, Gyorgy Krasso, Zsolt Krokovay, Gabriella Lengyel, Sandor Lezsak, Fruzina Magyar, Imre Mecs, Miklos Meszoly, Tamas Mikes, Tamas Molnar, Andras Nagy, Jeno Nagy, Tibor Pakh, Robert Palinkas, Gyula Perlaki, Gyorgy Petri, Sandor Racz, Sandor Radnoti, Laszlo Rajk, Laszlo Rusai, Ottilia Solt, Miklos Sulyok, Jeno

[1] From *Le Monde*, October 22, 1986, p.6, translated by FBIS, *Daily Report*, October 29, 1986, volume 2, p. AA1.

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Szell, Margit Szecsi, Sandor Szilagyi, Pal Szalai, Jozsef Talata, Gaspar Miklos Tamas, Mihaly Vajda, Domokos Varga, Lajos Vargyas, Judit Vasarhelyi, Miklos Vasarhelyi.

German Democratic Republic: Martin Boettger, Baerbel Bohley, Rainer Dietrich, Werner Fischer, Peter Grimm, Monika Haeger, Ralf Hirsch, Herbert Miszlitz, Lutz Nagorski, Gerd Poppe, Ulrike Poppe, Wolfgang Rudderklau, Niko Schonfeld, Regina Templin, Wolfgang Templin, Mario Wetzky.

Czechoslovakia: Rudolf Battek, Vaclav Benda, Jan Carnogursky, Jiri Dienstbier, Miklos Duray, Jiri Gruntorad, Jiri Hajek, Vaclav Havel, Ladislav Hejdanek, Eva Kanturkova, Jan Kozlik, Miroslav Kusy, Ivan Lamper, Ladislav Lis, Vaclav Maly, Anna Marvanova, Martin Palous, Jiri Ruml, Jaroslav Sabata, Anna Sabatova, Libuse Silhanova, Milan Simecka, Frantisek Starek, Peter Uhl.

Poland: Konrad Bielinksi, Marian Brandys, Jacek Czaputowicz, Marek Edelman, Jacek Fedorowicz, Jan Andrzej Gorny, Janusz Grzelak, Zbigniew Janas, Jan Kielanowski, Wiktor Kulerski, Wladislaw Kunicki-Goldfinger, Zofia Kuratowska, Jacek Kuron, Jan Josef Lipski, Jan Litynski, Barbara Malak, Wojciech Maziarski, Adam Michnik, Leszek Moczulski, Piotr Niemczyk, Zofia Romaszewska, Zbigniew Romaszewski, Krystyna Starczewska, Stefan Starczewski, Aniela Steinsbergowa, Klemens Szaniawski, Jacek Szymanderski, Henryk Wujec.

If the memory of the Hungarian revolution serves as a source of inspiration for intense solidarity across national boundaries, Hungarian ruler Janos Kadar still refuses to recognize that his rule was made possible by the crushing of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet Army. Janos Berecz, a rising star of the Hungarian communist elite, was assigned the task to update the dogmatic verdict that saw the national anti-Stalinist insurrection as a "counter-revolution." His remarks about the 1956 "national tragedy" bear witness to the Kadar regime's perpetual ill conscience. Berecz's interview with the French daily Libération *indicates the limits of what some call Kadar's enlightened despotism. To acknowledge that the current regime was imposed on the Hungarian people by Soviet tanks would amount to a public confession of its illegitimacy. Hence Berecz's awkward explanations and rusty clichés about 1956.*

Hungarian Party Leader on 1956 Revolution[2]

[Interview with Janos Berecz, chairman of the MSZMP Hungarian Workers' Socialist Party, Central Committee Agitation and Propaganda Committee, by Véronique Soulé; "early in October" in Budapest]

[2] From *Libération*, October 23, 1986, p. 28, ibid., p. F1.

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LIBÉRATION: You are a specialist on the events of 1956. In your opinion was it a counterrevolution? A national tragedy? Or a revolution at the outset that was later diverted?

Janos Berecz: All three. There was a counterrevolution in 1956 because the aim was to overthrow the government and to alter the system of ownership. The movement was directed against the USSR and its allies.

It was also a national tragedy. Of course we had serious problems, but to resolve them it was necessary to halt the armed struggle and to restore order. A nation always prefers to rely on its own resources, but ours were inadequate. We needed foreign help. So it was no picnic.

Last, it was a democratic movement diverted from its aims. It embodied some revolutionary elements — party members and the majority of students and intellectuals, whose demands were just. Those people wanted to purify socialism and to rectify the errors. Many young people therefore thought they would die as heroes but they were mistaken.

LIBÉRATION: Has the official position changed over the past 30 years?

Janos Berecz: Yes. Until 1960-61 our propaganda documents spoke only in terms of counterrevolution. Then there was silence. After the amnesty it was necessary to heal the wounds. Only five years ago we began to reappraise the issue. Every five years Radio Free Europe would celebrate the "victories." And we remained silent as though we felt remorse. However, our society, the majority of which was born afterward, was interested in 1956. So in 1981 the television service organized a debate on the subject. I was one of the guests. I was afraid that television viewers would not be interested. However 3 million people watched and many of them asked for the program to be shown again.

East European dissidents understand that peace and freedom cannot be separated — that peace requires institutional guarantees for human rights. In this, they often disagree with the views of Western pacifist groups who seek peace at any price.

The memorandum that follows indicates the role East European dissidents and independent peace activists can play in the coalescence of a new approach to peace. Because they know the Soviet Union, they refuse to blame only the United States for all evils. The memorandum shows that the East Europeans' views have some influence on the views of West European leftists. The memorandum contains several claims consistently advocated by dissidents. It is thus of major importance that the document sees peace as a comprehensive objective, including freedoms, right, and social justice — not just the renunciation of weapons and the elimination of force from

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international relations. This memorandum was signed by hundreds of leaders of Western peace and environmentalist groups, as well as East European dissidents and independent peace activists — an unprecedented event.

Vienna Memorandum[3]
Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords

[A memorandum to citizens, groups and governments of all Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) countries]

For us, the three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act are interdependent. We oppose any tendency to play off peace against freedom or vice versa. A lasting détente cannot be bought at the cost of playing down the question of civil liberties and human — political and social — rights. Peace and security, détente and cooperation, basic rights and self-determination of peoples have to be achieved all together. Setbacks in any of these spheres have their negative effects on all others. We are aware that the Helsinki Accords do not provide satisfying answer [*sic*] to the most pressing problems of today such as the ever-widening rift between rich industrialized nations and Third World countries, the destructive effects of some forms of industrial and technological progress. Even though we cannot discuss these questions in detail they provide for us a necessary background for reflection and for political action in the framework of the CSCE process.

The growing contacts between independent and autonomous groups and individuals in East and West in recent years, and our common experience in developing a dialogue from below, have strengthened our conviction that more initiatives, proposals, and pressure from citizens and non-governmental organizations are required to revitalize the CSCE process.

In our view we need a new concept for a détente policy which should include the following elements:

— Peoples and governments of all CSCE countries need to recognize their own responsibility for solving the most urgent problems of our continent. Europeans should no longer look only to the superpowers and to bloc-to-bloc negotiations for providing solutions, but rather should try to develop their own initiatives and to strengthen existing tendencies towards a plurality of relationships between states in East and West.

[3] "Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords," Memorandum published by the European Network for East-West Dialogue, Berlin, November 1986.

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— Détente policy, to achieve permanent results, must have a firm basis not only on the governmental level, but within societies. Grass roots contacts and common activities between groups and individuals across frontiers can dissolve the structures of Cold War and prepare the ground for "Hot Peace." Official détente policy should create a framework which encourages the process of "détente from below."

We reject the use of military and para-military forces or secret service activities to suppress social changes within a country as well as any interference by such forces or threats of such interference into the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time we strongly advocate trans-frontier solidarity, mutual support and co-operation between people and groups working for peace, civil liberties, trade union rights, social justice, women's emancipation, or ecological goals. In our view such activities are essential contribution to our common efforts to build a new peaceful and democratic Europe.

Détente from Below

Mutual trust cannot be created solely by governments. It must be built up between citizens as well. All those who want promote the Helsinki principles should, in our view, not only try to mobilize public opinion in order to put pressure on governments. They also ought to think about what they can do themselves to further develop détente from below and to build bridges across the rift dividing our continent.

Forty years of separation and living in very different social realities have created a deep mutual alienation between Europeans on both sides of the rift. Even geographic terms seem to have changed their meaning. People in the West often speak of "Europe" when, in fact, they mean the member countries of the EEC. On the other hand terms like "East" and "West" are used in a rather loose political sense. Thus countries that by geography as well as political and cultural traditions belong to Central rather than to Eastern Europe find that they are considered as part of the "the East."

To rediscover together an all-European context and perspectives, people from all parts of this continent should, wherever possible, try to meet and to talk to each other. There are many ways to deepen contacts, once they are established: invitations on an individual basis and pen pals; pupil and student exchanges as well as scientific, cultural and sport exchanges; mutual visits between youth and vocational organizations, trade unions, churches and all kinds of popular music groups; twinning of towns. Many of these activities can be arranged outside of or in addition to official programmes. Representatives of political parties, trade unions, churches and other institutions in the West should use the opportunity of visits to Eastern

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Europe to meet both representatives of official or semi-official organizations and activists in independent groups. Of course, in the East there is a fundamental difference between independent groups and organizations and institutions which all have an official or semi-official character.

We reject all kinds of double standards for East and West in the application of basic rights and demand the full implementation of the whole catalogue of human rights as listed in the Helsinki Final Act and in the International Convenant on Political and Civil Rights and on Cultural, Economic and Social Rights in all CSCE countries. This also includes the right to form independent trade unions and to practice freely religious beliefs. Urgent first steps for the immediate future should include:

— Freedom of travel without visas between all CSCE countries and without any need to get special exit permission from one's own country, including the right to return. No restrictions on contact with foreigners.

— Freedom of mobility within one's country.

— Right of emigration for all citizens of all Helsinki countries without loss of personal property and without discrimination such as having to pay a huge ransom under the pretext of refunding for schooling or professional education.

— Recognition of the existence of an independent editing and publishing sector.

— No restriction on the transport of books, tapes, journals etc. across frontiers as long as they are the personal property of the traveller.

— The right of national and ethnic minorities to their own schools, autonomous cultural activities, and adequate representation in all public offices.

— Consideration of the proposal to acknowledge the status of political prisoners for people convicted for exercise of their civil rights and political beliefs.

— The immediate release of all political prisoners who in their activities have never used or advocated any form of violence.

— Abolition of all kinds of "Berufssverbote" (professional restrictions) as applied in many countries in East and West and of the practice, widespread in the East, of imprisoning people solely for being unemployed for political or non-political reasons.

— Abolition of the death penalty in all CSCE countries.

Moreover, we suggest the establishment of an all-European commission of human rights to which citizens of all CSCE countries and people from other continents living in these countries have a guaranteed legal right of appeal if they feel that their basic rights have not been respected.

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The outraged reaction of the East European ruling bureaucracies to this dissident offensive is not surprising. Vasil Bilak, chief ideologist of the Czechoslovak regime, openly admitted that the Stalinists would not give in to the new reformist wave. The following interview with Bilak — one of Alexander Dubček's adversaries during the Prague Spring and one of those most responsible for the purges after the Soviet invasion — illustrates his hard-line approach.

Why Gorbachev is Not Dubček: An Official Czech View[4]
Bilak Compares Current Restructuring With 1968

[Interview with Vasil Bilak, CPCZ Central Committee Presidium member and Central Committee secretary, by Zdenek Horen: "Inspiring Incentives for Us, Too; *Rude Pravo* Talks to Comrade Vasil Bilak About the Topical Issues of Creatively Developing Socialism" — date and place not given]

[Horeni] How would you characterize the response among our public by the changes that have been taking place in the Soviet Union since the 27th CPSU Congress?
[Bilak] The current efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet people are justly encountering what is, in general, a great and positive response. The CPSU's policy stands close to us; it corresponds to the needs of a dynamic development of socialism. It is encountering full support both in our party and among our people. We are following attentively and with sympathy all that is happening today in the Soviet Union. We have already spoken about this at the 17th CPCZ Congress and also at the Fourth CPCZ Central Committee Session. The efforts to restructure Soviet society are yielding a lot of inspiration and incentives for our own party and society, too. I see this as the third historical revolutionary event. The first was the Great October Socialist Revolution; the second was the Great Patriotic War, the victory over fascism, and the emergence of the world socialist system; and the third is the current mobilization of all material and spiritual forces in the Soviet Union to prove socialism's supremacy over all that is obsolete.
[Horeni] At the session of the Ideological Commission you mentioned people who also seem to applaud the Soviet effort, while in reality they merely want to act as parasites on it, striving in this way to rehabilitate the discredited right-wing opportunist policy of 1968. This is an obvious swindle.
[Bilak] The substance of this swindle, as you rightly call it, lies in the wish of certain people to misuse against socialism the general sympathy with which the social changes in the USSR are regarded, instead

[4] From *Rude Pravo*, February 20, 1987, p. 1, translated by FBIS, *Daily Report*, February 25, 1987, volume II, p. D1.

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of using it socialism's benefit. People who have not yet freed themselves from the fetters of right-wing opportunist dogmas are claiming that what is now happening in the CPSU is similar to what had been happening in our country in the crisis-ridden years. As the Soviet Union's sincere friends, we must categorically protest this.

It is absolutely evident that any comparison is inappropriate. What is happening in the CPSU and Soviet Union today is right, totally right, and must be fully supported. We have here a program formulated by the 27th congress, and the party leadership is consistently ensuring its implementation. The CPSU leadership and the broad support given by the people to the party's policy guarantee that the course that was correctly embarked upon will successfully develop and that people who would like to parasitize it will certainly not succeed.

Our people sympathize with this program; they view with sympathy the struggle waged for order, for civic, party, state, and technological discipline, for quality of production, and for a better flow of information.

What can be said about the people who had failed to pass the 1968 test in Czechoslovakia and who are now voicing some kind of "hopes" in connection with the restructuring in the USSR? Are they entitled to have such hopes? Certainly not. The followers of right-wing opportunism can have no hopes in Czechoslovakia.

[Horeni] How can one characterize the specific difference between CPSU's present objectives and the objectives of right-wing opportunists in the CSSR in the past?

[Bilak] The answer is unambiguous: Nothing is identical. The CPSU leadership is striving to strengthen socialism and the unity of the socialist community, whereas our "fighters for socialism with a human face" strove in 1968 to dismantle socialism and to break up the socialist community.

The CPSU is striving to consolidate the leading role of the workers class and of the Communist Party in society. The right-wing opportunists in Czechoslovakia were striving to weaken the leading role of the workers class and of its vanguard, the revolutionary party. They were striving to reactivate the bourgeois political parties and to create various antisocialist groupings. In foreign policy, they did not strive to consolidate the unity of the socialist community; they were striving to achieve our withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, a change of our foreign policy, a breaking of of our fraternal ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and so forth and so on.

The CPSU is striving to achieve tighter discipline in production in every respect, in the interests of further developing material production; but our adversaries used to introduce chaos into production and to disrupt discipline.

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Recently, we briefed our public on the principles of restructuring our economic mechanism. They purposefully aim to strengthen socialism. Well, this basically contradicts [Prague Spring Economist Ota] Sik's theories, which strove to introduce as many capitalist elements as possible into our economy.

In addition, the CPSU has a firm hold on the situation. The CPSU leadership is united; it is pursuing the line set by the 27th congress, and it is not retreating. Deplorably, during the period at the beginning of 1968 there was neither unity nor a clear-cut program in the leadership of our party. I am recalling this because it is necessary to reject unambiguously any and all parallels.

Naturally, I am also mentioning this because the Central Committee is receiving various letters from our fellow citizens, who are asking what will happen and how it will happen. It even receives letters (although only isolated letters) from people threatening the Communist Party and its individual members. Obviously the authors of these letters still recall very well the "democratic methods" they were using in 1968, including threats of the gallows.

The Soviet Union and the Soviet people are aware of their historic responsibility for building the socialist society. On this none-too-easy path they may encounter problems, difficulties, and shortcomings — but the direction itself is right. Things that were sufficient on this path yesterday are no longer sufficient today; that is why a new and more efficient course is logically needed.

We must also see that everywhere, in their country and in ours, there are many indolent, easygoing, and adaptable people and people who are slowing down or hampering the revolutionary restructuring. But the start is right, and the future belongs to it.

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Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS
by Adam Garfinkle

Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on the Freedom of Movement. By Alan Dowty. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. 270 pp. $20.00. Publication of *Closed Borders* forces us to wonder why scholars have long neglected the comparative treatment of large movements of peoples. The answer is not hard to find: simply, the task is enormous. Dowty covers a lot of territory, geographical and conceptual, in looking at a number of historical, legal, political, and moral issues. He notes that the right to leave is intimately connected to the right to arrive; but states that keep their citizens from free movement are deemed repressive while those that restrict immigration are seen as within their rights. Restricting emigration for reasons of ideology or the exigencies of totalitarian social control is disparaged, but trying to stem the brain drain is understood. Yet, Dowty notes, restriction is restriction, whatever the rationale. The historical perspective helps sharpen current issues. For example, mercantilist attitudes in the eighteenth century rendered human beings a form of economic property, so virtually all emigration to America then was technically illegal. Europe in the nineteenth century took a liberal attitude toward freedom of movement and passports became almost obsolete within Europe for a time.

Though Dowty clearly favors the right to emigrate, describing it as the last resort when other human rights are denied, he knows that contemporary political realities cannot bear the implications of free emigration. He turns time and again to the case of the Soviet Union, but no agency, not even the U.S. immigration service, avoids criticism.

Fictions of Nuclear Disaster. By David Dowling. Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1987. 239 pp. $20.00. Dowling has produced an annotated compilation and interpretation of more than 250 works of fiction dealing with nuclear disaster. His impressive effort rests on the fundamental premise that the future is built upon the past and on present images of it. Dowling argues that novelists imagining Armageddon and the post-nuclear society differ from strategic analysts only in that each group purveys a different realm of the future. Indeed, Dowling suggests that the imagination, which is always in the process of weaving images of reality into new mythologies, can

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help us better to live with the bomb. A better appreciation of apocalyptic visions — which, Dowling illustrates, has a history long predating the nuclear age — may help the security analyst appreciate the demons that lurk in the contemporary popular imagination — and perhaps in his own mind. Revealing these demons may in some small way help avoid, in the case of nuclear disaster at least, life imitating art.

Modern Diasporas in International Politics. Edited by Gabriel Sheffer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 349 pp. $32.50. Sheffer offers a pioneering political analysis of "trans-state ethnic networks," an increasingly common and significant sociological phenomenon. The cases studied here are interpreted in terms of three constants: the ethnic homeland, the host country, and the diaspora. Seven of the twelve essays look at specific cases: Indians, Chinese in Southeast Asia, Africans in the United States, Jews, Jewish fund raising for Israel, Palestinians, and Palestine under the British Mandate. Other essays consider the impact of homelands upon diasporas, the migration of labor as an incipient diaspora, and "diaspora and language." In a broad-ranging introduction, Sheffer wrestles with definitional problems, and an equally broad-ranging, but scattered, conclusion by Milton J. Esman tries to sum matters up. Highly technical, descriptive, or ineffective styles, coupled with a multiplicity of disciplines, make the book tough reading at times. Nevertheless, it offers a novel perspective on existing realities and this more than justifies the effort; the comparative study of diasporas may prove a fascinating new topic.

East-West Tensions in the Third World. Edited by Marshall Shulman. New York: The American Assembly/Norton, 1986. 232 pp. $16.95 (paper). The eminent scholars assembled here cover regional relations (Mideast, Latin America, Asia, and Africa), economics, and military ties in standard fashion. Many essays seem dated; old debates are reviewed while current issues are ignored. There is no discussion about the Reagan Doctrine of support for anti-Soviet rebellions. Dramatic changes in the Third World debate about economic policy — especially the new interest in free markets thanks to the newly industrialized countries of southeast Asia — also merits no mention. The Assembly is optimistic about the prospects for East-West cooperation, while de-emphasizing Soviet expansionism (Afghanistan gets only fleeting mention). And several authors argue that East-West relations in the Third World need not be "zero sum"; at times, both powers can simultaneously have improved relations with the same country.

— P.C.

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AMERICAN POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
by Adam M. Garfinkle

American High: The Years of Confidence 1945-1960. By William L. O'Neill. New York: The Free Press, 1986. 321 pp. $19.95. *American High* has been widely reviewed and advertised as an important social analysis of the early postwar period. It does hold interest as the author's sequel to *Coming Apart* (1971), a popular volume of similar design about the 1960s. It also has some special interest now that the Reagan era is being called another epoch of American confidence and strength, making it a book that speaks about the past to the present. But *American High* does not serve as a vicarious analysis of the present because it offers a shallow reading of the past.

Indeed, it is frequently worse than shallow; it is misleading. O'Neill's account of the debate over whether to build thermonuclear weapons, for example, is replete with error. He leaves the impression that the weight/yield efficiency of fusion weapons is less than that of fission weapons, that the U.S. arsenal today is made up of fission weapons, and that ICBMs and MIRVs were factors in the decision to build an H-bomb circa 1954 — before the former existed and before the latter was even contemplated. This and many other lapses of competence peg *American High* as a cross between an undergraduate thesis and a beach book.

Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security. By William E. Burrows. New York: Random House, 1986. 401 pp. $19.95. In the jargon of intelligence work, "black" means secret, and William Burrows's topic is the blackest of the black — the world of space espionage, KH-11s, the National Reconaissance Office, and the National Security Agency. This multifaceted volume examines in detail the history of overhead reconaissance, skillfully weaving technological, bureaucratic, personal, and political stories in an engaging narrative. Those who try to follow arms control issues will revel in a wealth of detail about verification considerations that were previously only guesses; Burrows reveals the secret underside of a very public set of problems. The general reader will be amazed to find out what is knowable from miles in the sky, even if details about satellite systems and ASAT imponderables elude him.

Alas, there are problems. Burrows denies that his book is a breach of national security, arguing that he himself was never on the inside and that he researched the book entirely in the open literature. Probably true, but a book as detailed as this must help interested parties to triangulate the truth on the basis of what they already know. The American reader faces the opposite problem: having no alternative source for much of the narrative, he has no good way to

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assess the veracity of Burrows's account. Another problem: the end of the book contains a pro-arms control polemic that cannot but distract the reader. In effect, the author argues that since verification is not a serious impediment to strategic arms control, nothing else is either. If one can separate willful advocacy from edifying narration, *Deep Black* makes an absorbing read.

The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of America's Defense Establishment. By Richard A. Stubbing, with Richard A. Mendel. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 445 pp. $21.50. Like many recent volumes on the U.S. military establishment — by Halloran, Hadley, Luttwak, Lind, Rasor, and others — this one points to the Pentagon's ponderous, self-serving, uncreative, and policy-bound bureaucracy as the main culprit. There is certainly much truth in these allegations, but one begins to wonder if this is the whole story. The problem with this entire literature, Stubbing's book included, is that no author seems to have large enough hands and broad enough shoulders to grasp the full range of related issues.

Like much of the literature, *The Defense Game* has an anecdotal style; pillars of judgment tower above grains of evidence. Most of the book's twenty chapters contain lively inside-the-beltway gossip that add little to the general stock of knowledge. The final seven chapters on the management styles of defense secretaries from McNamara to Weinberger should have been condensed into a single chapter or published separately. The author's two decades at the National Security Division of the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Management and Budget inform his fine chapters on the budget process and Pentagon purchasing and payroll. But they are far too brief and are more suitable for students than scholars. Stubbing would have done far better to rely more upon his own experience to produce a book of narrower purview but deeper analysis.

To Arm A Nation. By Richard Halloran. New York: Macmillan, 1986. 396 pp. $21.95. The military correspondent of the *New York Times* argues that the armed forces of the United States are not effectively prepared to maintain the peace and serve the national interest. The reason is the legacy of Vietnam, notably the split between what Halloran calls "the field and the flagpole." The thesis is an old one: soldiers are doing a great job but the Pentagon is guilty of criminal neglect and malfeasence. Halloran offers ten bold suggestions for rescuing the military from its own organizational squalor. One is abandoning preparation for "protracted nuclear war" — preparations that Halloran appears to misconstrue — and freezing the defense budget for five years, regardless of what our adversaries may do, in order to force the defense department to live rationally within its means.

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Though an engaging writer, Halloran is not sufficiently expert on all aspects of the military to write a successful broad-ranging critique. The book is superficial in places, presumptuous with judgment in others, and generally bent over backwards in pursuit of the middle of the political road. He attributes too much and the wrong kind of importance to Vietnam and treats problems with the procurement process anecdotally. This is less a book for the professional soldier or scholar of the military than it is for the vaguely liberal reading public and Democratic politicians seeking a handle on an important but notoriously complicated subject.

Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders. Edited by Edward P. Crapol. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987. 200 pp. $32.95. Crapol has collected essays from various periods of American history about nine women who had something to do with foreign policy. Regrettably, that is about all one can say about this book. A collection of this sort must be organized thematically, but the editor has given no theoretical superstructure. The essays, which should be critical, are mainly hagiographic. And the individuals are so disparate — including Lydia Marie Child, Lucia True Ames Mead, Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Jane Fonda, and Jeane Kirkpatrick — that they share only their being female. And that is just not enough for a book.

Smaller problems also plague the essays. Many authors focus so intently on their subject, they neglect to explain the context in which she acted; because life is impoverished in the retelling, the women under scrutiny become larger than life. The intent to praise is often distracting, even funny on occasion. Jeanne Zeidler has the right title: "Speaking Out, Selling Out, Working Out: The Changing Politics of Jane Fonda." But while the facts damn, the author cannot; the pages blush with the tension between evidence provided and conclusions withheld.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

Economic Policy in an Interdependent World. By Richard Cooper. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986. 331 pp. $25.00. Cooper is remarkably adept at presenting well-reasoned arguments about the leading international economic issues of the day, using mathematics to facilitate reasoning rather than to replace analysis. He has long supported — or rather, shaped — the conventional view on appropriate policy re-

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sponses to global economic problems. Not a celebrated economic theoretician, Cooper has nonetheless excelled at perceiving how theoretical debates should influence policy making.

To read this collection of essays from 1970 through 1985 is to review the changes of the period: the concern in the twilight of the Bretton Woods era about economic interdependence undermining national economic goals, the rationale for the post-oil-shock locomotive theory (that the United States, Germany, and Japan should stimulate their economies to provide the locomotive for world growth), the debates about the level of state economic involvement most suitable for growth, the early 1980s discussion about the optimum level of foreign borrowing to finance development, and the current concern about coordinating macroeconomic policies among the major powers. The first four essays are discursive, while the argument in the latter six can be followed even by those who wish to skip the mathematics.

Economic Relations in the Asian-Pacific Region. Edited by Bruce Dickson and Harry Harding. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 91 pp. $10.95. This extended pamphlet is a frustrating report on a June 1985 conference co-sponsored by Brookings and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The reader gets mere snippets of what appear to have been first-rate papers and discussions. Only one page is given to Charles Pearson's "ladder theory," which is more than a kissing cousin to the product life-cycle theory: the newly-industrialized East Asian countries will be pushed by Chinese development to vacate the lower rungs on the ladder of product sophistication which they took from Japan in the 1960s. But the presentation is chaotic, with rapporteurs' presentations and the speakers' thoughts thoroughly entangled. The text makes it appear that, when discussing Japan and the newly industrialized countries, there are no significant differences between Chinese and American participants (comments are identified only by the speaker's nationality); if true, this would be fascinating and important. But perhaps the rapporteurs distorted the proceedings by recording only those comments of most interest to American readers — there is no way to tell. The material on China is quite enlightening, despite its ideological content.

The Financial Revolution. By Adrian Hamilton. New York: Free Press, 1986. 257 pp. $19.95. Hamilton's accessible, well-organized account of the world-wide transformation of financial institutions in the last twenty years pays special attention to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Changes in the banking and securities industries resulted primarily from the internationalization of markets and new technologies. As the author notes, deregulation of the fi-

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nancial industry was largely a late reaction to what technology and competition from other countries had made inevitable. Hamilton's strength is in explaining how the banking and securities industries function. He appears out of his depth in a final chapter on why changes in the industries are a bad thing; there are serious arguments to be made about whether financial flexibility aggravates or eases economic instability, but he does not make them. Nor does he discuss in any detail the implications of financial flexibility for the whole economy. Has the financial revolution contributed to exchange rate volatility? Or has it permitted the world to adjust to shocks like the oil price changes with a minimum of disruption? A comprehensive glossary provides easily understandable definitions of many financial terms.

Politics, Foreign Trade and Economic Development: A Study of the Dominican Republic. By Claudio Vedovato. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 187 pp. $27.50. Vedovato argues against the common theory of developmentalists that the government "is impartial in the sense that in the choice between different policy options its only concern is for the public interest." He suggests instead that "government power in the Dominican Republic has traditionally been used to increase the rulers' personal wealth and to favour certain groups or individuals." While not concealing his sympathies for the Left, Vedovato presents his evidence without distortion. Indeed, it is interesting to see a leftist supporting theories similar to those of James Buchanan, the 1986 winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, who has been widely attacked by liberal columnists as a conservative ideologue. Vedovato makes the intriguing claim that the differences in economic performance between the Dominican Republic and some East Asian countries has been largely due to the anti-rural policies enforced by rulers who introduced distortions in the pursuit of personal goals.

Theory and Reality in Development. Edited by Sanjaya Lall and Francis Stewart. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 278 pp. $29.95. Honoring one of the most prominent proponents of the "institutionalist" view, Paul Streeten (editor of *World Development* and director of Boston University's World Development Institute), this collection of essays sticks close to home. In particular, Keith Griffin argues that "agricultural performance in countries where communal tenure [i.e., collectivist] systems dominate has in general been significantly better than in countries where individual tenure systems dominate." Griffin even suggests that collective agriculture has often been welcomed by farmers. The most obvious and important recent evidence to refute Griffin is a comparison of two periods in Chinese agriculture: the collectivism of 1957-78 and the limited liberalization of 1978-84

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(see the World Bank's 1986 Development Report). In the first period, grain output rose 2.6 percent per annum; in the second, 6.1 percent; the figures for cotton are 2.1 percent and 11.5 percent; and so on. Further essays draw on the Streeten tradition that state attention to "basic needs" through interventionist government policies helps the poor more effectively than policies to maximize long-term growth.

Theory of Population and Economic Growth. By Julian Simon. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 224 pp. $24.95. Julian Simon continues to elaborate an optimistic view of the future of humanity to the intense annoyance of those persuaded that the world faces population excess and environmental disaster. Simon argues that population growth contributes to economic growth. Clearly, more people means more hands available to labor, but the familiar phenomenon of declining marginal returns suggests that the return to each additional laborer would fall unless other factors of production also increase. Simon's argument holds that a larger population leads to greater technological change. The numbers available to produce inventions increase (a factor he overemphasizes), as does the demand for inventions. In Simon's words, this volume demonstrates that a sensible model of the effect of population growth must treat the growth of technology as endogenous.

The Utility of International Economic Sanctions. Edited by David Leyton-Brown. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 312 pp. $32.50. Leyton-Brown has written a balanced and intelligent analysis of sanctions with an emphasis on motivation and circumstance. It is possible, for instance, to support sanctions against the Soviet Union but not against South Africa, or vice versa. In the first case, it could be argued that trade with the Soviets benefits their military machine while sanctions on South Africa cause unemployment among black workers. In the second case, it could be said that imported computers benefit the Soviets only to the extent that they open up their society to the free flow of information, while sanctions on South Africa morally isolate a regime that claims to be part of the West. In separate essays, Lawrence Brady and Leyton-Brown establish guidelines for the most effective use of sanctions. Noting the limits of sanctions, they stress the need for realistic expectations. Other essays study the impact of sanctions on the initiator (the 1980-81 U.S. grain embargo and the 1981-82 U.S. pipeline sanctions) or their impact on third parties (the Arab boycott's effect on the United States and the impact on Canada of U.S. sanctions on the Soviets). Further studies look at sanctions by multilateral organizations (such as the United Nations), sanctions against Eastern-bloc countries, and sanctions by Arab countries.

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WAR STUDIES
by John Maurer

Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-46. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Atheneum, 1987. 686 pp. $27.50. The origins of the Cold War continue to fascinate historians and political commentators alike. Could the Cold War have been avoided? Which side — East or West — bears the greatest burden for its outbreak? Was the Cold War started by aggressive Soviet behavior and disregard for the aspirations of the East European peoples? Or did the United States and Britain challenge the Soviet state's legitimate security concerns?

Hugh Thomas's history shows that there is always room for another account of even a very intensely studied topic. By skillfully describing the motivations and actions of the great powers and weighing the risks at stake in the conflict, he has transcended earlier accounts of the origins of the Cold War that focus on U.S. decision making and atomic diplomacy. With great acuity, he shows how the roots of the Cold War can be found in Soviet imperialism. According to Thomas, "because of the character of its leaders, its ideology and its internal mood, [the Soviet state] could not have fitted into any design to create a tranquil world." Nor does he neglect the fate of the smaller states caught between the great powers — the hapless peoples of Eastern Europe who exchanged Nazi control for Soviet domination. A fuller account of the Cold War's origins will only appear when access to Soviet state and party archives is made available. And the best news is, this volume is the first of several examining the Cold War.

Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921-37. By Christopher Hall. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 303 pp. $37.50. The Washington Conference (1921-22) established a treaty system that reduced and limited yesterday's deterrent — the great powers' dreadnought battle fleets. But this early arms control regime, subsequently strengthened at the London Conference of 1930, was short-lived, doomed by the end of democracy in Japan and Italy as well as the rising power of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. These states cynically violated treaties while exploiting them to lull rearmament efforts by the democracies.

Hall's useful account of the arms control achievements of the 1920s and the breakdown of the Washington treaty system in the 1930s offers insight into the current debate in the United States over the value of arms control. In his view, the greatest accomplishment of arms control during the interwar period was to avert a potentially disasterous rivalry between Britain and the United States. But, he concludes, arms control could do little to reduce deep-rooted tensions

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between the great powers during the 1930s. This important assessment has obvious relevance for the present.

Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Center, 1987. 96 pp. $3.60. Canada is one of the wealthiest countries in NATO and one of the most poorly armed. Brian Mulroney's government, however, is determined to change this state of affairs. Under the able leadership of Minister of Defence Perrin Beatty, Canada will embark on the major new defense initiatives outlined in this White Paper. In particular, the decision to acquire a force of ten to twelve nuclear-powered attack submarines — a force almost equal to Britain's — represents a sharp break with the past. The White Paper rightly argues that diesel-powered submarines cannot provide the required range and endurance to defend Canadian territorial waters in the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific. Most likely, Canada will purchase British Trafalgar-class submarines at an approximate cost of $350 million each. Given the huge costs of this program and the expanded role envisioned for the Canadian navy, this decision has touched off a major defense debate in Canada. And it is likely that a change of government after a general election would scuttle this ambitious expansion of Canadian naval power. Because this submarine force represents an important addition to NATO, Canada's defense debate deserves close attention.

Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II. By Eric J. Grove. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 416 pp. $34.95. At the close of the Second World War, the British navy was second only to that of the United States. Yet, Britain could not afford the costs of maintaining such strength. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Labour government quickly moved to enforce a policy of retrenchment that reduced the size of Britain's fleet and hindered efforts at building new warships. At each stage of Britain's decline as a naval power, politicians used the paucity of resources as a cudgel to deny recalcitrant admirals their shipbuilding programs. And Conservative governments proved as tight fisted as Labour.

As British naval power declined, Soviet naval power has grown to the point that the Royal Navy today is no match even for the Soviet Northern Fleet based on the Kola peninsula. That a European continental state should outpace Britain at sea would have been unthinkable to Britons at the turn of the century. Yet, Soviet Russia succeeded where Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany failed. Here is a vivid example, then, of a country that lost an arms race, despite an initially favorable starting point.

Grove chronicles Britain's decline as a naval power with great skill. He provides a wealth of new information based on recently released archival sources and interviews with participants. These

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detail the Whitehall battles between politicians and the armed services over the distribution of defense resources, infighting that determined the size and quality of the Royal Navy at present. Moreover, as Grove reminds us, Britain's relative decline as a naval power has not ended; more cuts are probably in store in the near future. Grove's account is a model of scholarship and highly recommended; where are comparable histories on the U.S. and Soviet navies since World War II?

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

The Ba'th and the Creation of Modern Syria. By David Roberts. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 182 pp. $35.00. Roberts has written an informal, opinionated account of the Ba'th Party from the 1940s to the present. While a large portion of his material on the first two decades comes straight from the work of such scholars as Devlin, Ma'oz, Rabinovich, and van Dam, the author's extensive first-hand experience as British ambassador to both Syria and Lebanon informs his analysis of the last quarter-century, and the result is valuable indeed. Roberts's central concern is the transformation of the Ba'th from a party of lively political debate and chaotic evolution to the static but solid pillar of a militarized state. He shows that as the soldiers took over and "the ideological pendulum stopped swinging," other problems rose to the surface, pre-eminently the sectarian confrontation between 'Alawis and Sunnis.

In response, the regime adopted the "powerful and active political myth" of Greater Syria, a goal Roberts sees as "the only consistent strand" in recent Syrian foreign policy. As a corollary, he concludes that the Damascus government gains from the existence and policies of Israel. "If by chance the pressures on Israel (such as inflation, reverse migration and above all the demographic time-bomb of the Arab population within Israeli territory) were to drive it to seek peace by concession, the consequences for Syria could be adverse."

Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. By Olivier Roy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 253 pp. $24.95. Roy, a French anthropologist who has made annual trips to Afghanistan since the 1980 Soviet invasion, blends the knowledge of the specialist with the timely information of the traveler to produce a brilliant and very important study of the *mujahidin*. His central thesis is that the ability

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of Afghans to work together will determine the war's outcome. Should Afghan solidarity falter, the Soviet Union will win; should it improve, the resistance will win; and if it remains as it is, the war will continue indefinitely.

Roy believes the resistance has taken proper steps to avoid separation from the civilians, claiming that it "probably takes more care than any other comparable movement to ensure that the civilian population receives fair treatment." Also, the war has imbued Afghans with a new sense of solidarity — in contrast to their old factiousness. But the Afghans need more than solidarity; they will win only if they form wide-ranging, cohesive guerrilla groups that can roam the whole country (and not be limited to their own tribal grounds, as they usually are at present).

As for U.S. policy, Roy's analysis suggests that, beyond weapons, the resistance could use help in developing the two major tools it lacks: a radio station to provide trustworthy news and an underground network to operate in areas under Soviet control. This is a voice to heed.

Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: Islamic Laws in a Modern State. Edited by Anita Weiss. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986. 146pp. $19.95. **The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan**. By Ishtiaq Ahmed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 235 pp. $32.50. Despite their similar titles, these are very different books. Weiss's edited volume contains valuable studies on the specific ways in which Zia ul-Haq has implemented an Islamic order in Pakistan, looking at such issues as ethnicity, economics, welfare, and women. Ann Elizabeth Meyer's chapter on changes in the tax laws is outstanding, managing to turn a seemingly mundane issue into a major tool of analysis. Richard Kurin's fine piece highlights the unexpected effects of Islamization on the quiet majority who live in the rural areas.

In contrast to these small but detailed studies, Ahmed looks at the debate over the role of Islam in public life. Unfortunately, he interprets this fascinating controversy with the tools of current political science theory. This serves as a kind of filter through which the Pakistani thinkers are viewed — abstracting them from their environment and making them bloodless. Only the author's intelligence and knowledge of the subject save the work. The reader who does not already know Islam and Pakistan will find *The Concept of An Islamic State* rough going; but whoever does know them will find it a moderately useful guide to the debate.

Reveal and Conceal: Dress in Contemporary Egypt. By Andrea B. Rugh. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986. 185 pp. $29.95. Rugh provides a fascinating field guide to the way Egyptians dress

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that offers a new approach to the interpretation of political attitudes. She shows how a wide array of differences — geographic, generational, religious, ideological, educational, social, and stylistic — are directly reflected by the clothes Egyptians (especially females) chose to wear. And a complex topic it is, too. Expectations, for example, depend in part on social level. Modesty imposes restrictions that vary according to social class: the same mini-skirt will appear fashionable on a rich woman, presumptuous on a middle-class one, and immodest on a poor one. The rich rarely wear casual clothes, for to do so would be to give up their membership in the elite stratum. Among the poor, young people may wear foreign clothes for which their elders would be ridiculed. And so forth; in Rugh's hands, clothing reveals much that is new and fascinating about Egyptian life.

Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution. Edited by Martin Kramer. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 324 pp. $39.85. Although Shi'i Muslims number about 80 million, or 10 percent of the entire Muslim population, Western scholars have traditionally overlooked them in favor of the much more numerous Sunnis. In part, this is because Shi'is lived at some distance from Europe, in part because they tended to stay in remote and inaccessible refuges. This easy neglect of Shi'ism came to an abrupt end with the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1978. Since then, the driving question has been that of revolt: when and why are Shi'is quietist, when and why do they seek to overthrow the existing order? Of course, Kramer's volume gives pride of place to Iran; but its most original studies are the systematic surveys of little known Shi'is outside Iran — in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Especially fascinating are Joseph Kostiner's analysis of Shi'i unrest in the Gulf and Kramer's own survey of 'Alawi efforts to pass themselves off as mainstream Shi'is. This well-conceived and tightly edited volume has only one major defect: the total and inexplicable absence of North Yemen. Shi'is make up more than half the Yemeni population, and their tradition of power and distance from Iran should make them key to any comparative study of Shi'is in public life.

Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945. By Philip S. Khoury. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 698 pp. $55.00. Coming shortly after the author's book on Damascus politics in the 1860-1920 period, this massive study establishes Khoury as a leading student of Syrian history. Extensive archival research, interviews with aged participants, and virtually every secondary source bearing on his subject went into the book. Unfortunately, the result is ponderous (the narrative goes on for dozens of pages without any apparent destination) and is marred by two deep flaws. First, a quiet yet dogmatic Marxism insinuates itself

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in Khoury's account. Worn theories of imperialist exploitation, capitalist contradictions, and even class conflict drive the analysis. Second, Khoury is so interested in the evolution of Pan-Arab nationalism (as the sub-title indicates) that he neglects and distorts the other major political movement of the era, Pan-Syrian nationalism. Both problems affect the book's interpretations and lead to some very learned but profoundly skewed conclusions. If the specialist must acquaint himself with the new information Khoury provides, the general reader should stick to Stephen H. Longrigg's reliable 1958 study, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate.*

Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally. By Dankwart A. Rustow. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987. 155 pp. $14.95. Rustow offers an upbeat view of Turkey and its relations with the United States in this short and well-executed survey. He makes three main points. First, during Turkey's nearly forty years of elections, six out of seven voters have supported the mainstream parties just to the right and left of center. Rustow calls this firm commitment to democratic values "the most impressive single feature of Turkey's recent political life." Second, political troubles in the 1950s and 1970s resulted not from a divided electorate but from poorly thought out political structures, which gave first too much and then too little power to the prime minister; the author believes the 1982 constitution and election law has remedied this problem. Third, Turkey's firm alliance with the West keeps the Soviet Union from dominating Damascus and Cairo as it does Warsaw and Prague. Rustow makes a convincing case that the Turkish bulwark provides the whole Middle East (including Israel) with room to maneuver; without it, the region would effectively come under the Soviet thumb. Writing with evident affection for Turkey and appreciation for the benefits it brings the United States in NATO and the Middle East, Rustow worries that American neglect of Turkey will lead to dire consequences.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
by Arthur Waldron

China: Asia's Next Economic Giant? By Dwight H. Perkins. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1986. 109 pp. $12.95 The prospect of China's economy taking off has fascinated Westerners at least since the days of "Oil for the Lamps of China." Perkins presents an updated version of that dream — pronounced in the language of academic economics, hedged with qualifiers, and buttressed

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with documentation. He begins with the "East Asian development experience," a pattern of culturally determined traits, including the Confucian heritage, high literacy rates, and a modicum of political stability. Then he argues that China's development experience has, since the reforms following Mao's death, begun to converge with that of its neighbors — an intuitively appealing argument for anyone who has watched Chinese enterprise transform first Hong Kong, then the New Territories, seemingly jump the border to Shenzhen, and then move up river to Canton and beyond. His thesis undoubtedly contains more than a kernel of truth, particularly for coastal China.

But to apply even a greatly modified version of it to the remainder of that vast country is risky, as has become clear in the two years since Perkins wrote down these thoughts. Economic growth in China has not ceased during this period, but recent developments suggest some modifications in Perkins's thesis. Chinese culture certainly brings something to modernization, but the real difference between mainland China and Hong Kong is the system: one is socialist, the other free-market. Perkins acknowledges the importance of the economic system, but he is too optimistic, assuming that the Chinese can solve their problems. Swept along by his relentlessly macroeconomic approach, he does not linger over those problems. From the perspective of 1987, however, it is clear that the system remains the heart of the matter. That being the case, it may make more sense to compare China with the countries that resemble it structurally, not culturally. To do so would better explain what now looks to be not convergence, but continuing divergence between the Chinese and the rest of the East Asia.

The China Connection: U.S. Policy and the People's Republic of China. By A. James Gregor. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 263 pp. $24.50. Developments since publication have done much to confirm the basic contentions of this sober survey of the prospects for American relations with the People's Republic of China. That relationship, as Gregor points out, has sailed under a number of flags: strategic in the early 1970s when Nixon and Kissinger emphasized "triangular diplomacy"; economic as China moved back into international trade (and turned down the heat on the Soviet border); and today it seems to be looked at as an end in itself.

To build a coherent prescription for future policy, the author examines most of the usual elements of the two relationship: political prospects, military cooperation, trade, Taiwan. On all but the last he is decidedly pessimistic. He predicts no end to political struggle in China, and argues that this rules Peking out as a suitable security partner for the United States. Arming China will have little effect on the Soviet Union, but could cause trouble in Southeast Asia and the Taiwan strait. Economic relations are likely to be unrewarding,

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and even downright risky (oil exploration in disputed waters is an example). Recent developments, such as the ouster of Hu Yaobang, possible Chinese arms sales to Iran, and continuing friction over economic relations, underline the soundness of his points, and the importance of his call for caution in bilateral ties.

Korea and the West. By Brian Bridges. London, New York and Andover: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers, No. 33. 112 pp. 5.95. Bridges surveys the contemporary Korean peninsula and offers an important European perspective. Not least of this fine monograph's strengths are its clarity, concision, and effective deployment of facts, particularly evident in its economic and military chapters. These give the reader just the information he would like, ranging from the general (such as economic aggregates and the balance of forces) to the significant specifics (such as details on North Korean joint ventures and the importance of precise weapons systems).

But the analysis really distinguishes this book. Bridges points out that thirty years ago the two Koreas were in close competition to modernize, with the North even doing better for a while. This has changed with the South's economic break-out. Now the two states face almost opposite internal challenges — liberalization in the South and the perhaps impossible maintenance of a family dynasty in the North.

Western Europe, Bridges stresses, knows Korea chiefly through Moonies and M*A*S*H and tends to underestimate its importance: significantly, Korean is the only major Asian language in which the B.B.C. does not broadcast. Yet the author maintains that Western Europe, which is far less involved emotionally with Korean issues than are China, the Soviet Union, Japan, or the United States, could play a steadying role in the peninsula. While reassuring South Korea it could pursue unofficial contacts with the North. It could also take small but significant steps toward the South — by opening a European Community delegation office in Seoul (instead of working from Tokyo), showing more hospitality to Korean graduate students, and treating South Korea in a way appropriate to its accomplishments and status.

Understanding Communist China: Communist China Studies in the United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978. By Tai-chun Kuo and Ramon H. Myers. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 172 pp. $17.95. Who was able to figure out what about China when "China watching" was an arcane discipline practiced chiefly in Hong Kong, Taipei, and the United States? Kuo and Myers focus on two groups in this sober and painstaking survey: experts in Taiwan, themselves Chinese, mostly employed by a government locked in con-

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frontation with Peking, empirical and intuitive in their approach; and Americans, mostly based in university centers and partial to social-science methodology.

The Republic of China government was not above fabricating "secret Communist documents," and this reviewer remembers the suspicion under which Taipei experts labored. Yet if one looks at the two groups' track records, the China watchers in Taipei won hands down. More than $41 million was poured into China research at American universities between 1959 and 1970, and while certain individual scholars turned out to have been very perceptive, most of the consensus scholarship of the period had to be substantially revised after Mao's death. By contrast, much of what Taipei produced has turned out to be solid. The reasons for this disparity have implications for far more than China studies. Although a native grasp of the Chinese language and culture, and access to Republic of China intelligence helped the Taipei group, Kuo and Myers argue that it was analytical approach more than anything else that made the difference. Taipei China watchers were and are intensely anti-communist, and their language does not sit well with American social scientists. But they consistently grasped what the authors term the power struggle aspect of mainland Chinese politics, while Americans were often beguiled by grand schemes and dazzled by rhetoric.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

East Germany and Détente. Building Authority After the Wall. By A. James McAdams. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 233 pp. $34.50. McAdams's familiarity with the domestic scene in the German Democratic Republic provides fresh insight into some of its basic political problems. Without abandoning the old patron saints of the GDR — Marx, Lenin, and, to a lesser extent, Rosa Luxemburg — Erich Honecker's Prussian socialism has recently focused on such figures as Martin Luther and Otto von Bismarck. While Honecker remains for all practical purposes a Soviet loyalist, he seeks to infuse a new sense of national identity into East Germans.

McAdams handles East German official texts and documents with a masterful touch. His interpretation of the GDR's political symbolism helps to understand, for example, the role of the Berlin Wall in the consolidation of an intrinsically artificial system: since its erection, the GDR economy has became the most advanced in the Communist bloc, but political autonomy has not increased and repres-

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sion remains unmitigated. His study looks at the implications of détente for Soviet-dominated countries and shows that for Honecker, as well as for Moscow, détente and conflict with the West are perfectly compatible. In other words, the East German leaders do not envision a genuine overhaul of their ideological monopoly and continue to preach the superiority of their system. No significant internal changes should therefore be expected from the government of the GDR.

Mémoires: De Budapest à Paris. By François Fejtö. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1986. 323 pp. FF 140.00. A leading journalist and author of a classic history of people's democracies, Fejtö has borne witness to crucial events in this century. As a young literary critic and socialist militant he took part in pre-war Hungarian radical circles. Together with the poet Attila Jozsef, Fejtö then grew disenchanted with Stalinism and the obtuse politics of Hungarian Communists. Exiled to France, he continued to watch developments in Eastern and Central Europe. His lingering hopes for communism were dispelled by the judicial murder of his friend Laszlo Rajk in a notorious 1949 Stalinist frame-up in Budapest. Exhilarated by the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, Fejtö later welcomed the Prague Spring as the prelude to the renaissance of a pluralist order in Central Europe.

Fejtö's has been a tormented life. His world view is certainly indebted to Raymond Aron's critical philosophy of history and his memoirs are punctuated with colorful portraits of such influential personalities as Aron, Georg Lukacs, Attila Jozsef, Milovan Djilas, and Eugène Ionesco. He has preserved from his Central European spiritual heritage a profound sense of decency and a wry approach to human follies.

Opposition in the GDR Under Honecker, 1971-85. An Introduction and Documentation. By Roger Woods. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 257 pp. $29.95. The reader will find in this near exhaustive presentation of opposition and dissent in the German Democratic Republic significant documents on the struggle of East German intellectuals against official censorship. These intellectuals questioned the militarization of their political and social life, and responded by linking peace and freedom. Their views struck responsive chords among the youth and compelled the government to engage in a dialogue of sorts with the unofficial peace groups, especially after 1968. Some of the opposition's most articulate spokesmen are disenchanted Marxists who think that the regime does not live up to its humanistic promises. They see themselves as democratic Marxists who seek reforms within the system. Others, however, think in terms of changing the system. The actions of the unofficial peace movement do not challenge the existing form of power, but they certainly go beyond what the government is ready to accept. As Woods suggests,

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East German opposition activity has helped to raise the level of popular expectations, and whoever succeeds Honecker will have to deal with these social aspirations.

Russian Studies. By Leonard Schapiro. Edited by Ellen Dahrendorf with an Introduction by Harry Willetts. New York: Viking, 1987. 400 pp. $24.95. Schapiro was one of those scholars for whom Russian intellectual and political history are inextricably linked. This collection of essays includes some of his most illuminating contributions on such topics as the liberal tradition in Russia; the evolution of Russian Marxism and the conflict between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks; Lenin's intellectual formation and the Russian revolutionary background; the role of the Jews in the Russian revolutionary movement; and some fine essays on Russian literature, primarily dealing with the political views of authors like Herzen, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Blok, and Solzhenitsyn.

Schapiro excoriated wishful thinking in Western approaches to Soviet matters, especially the illusion that "at bottom the Soviet Union is reasonable and basically motivated by the same aims as the Western nations." He rightly assigned this misleading view shared by many Western statesmen to an ignorance of Soviet history or a failure to comprehend Communist party literature and the role of ideology on Soviet aims.

Shapiro offers many provocative hypotheses. For example, he regards Bolshevism as an essentially Russian movement, traditional and nationalistic, with a very thin veneer of international socialism — exactly the opposite of Solzhenitsyn's conviction that Marxism and Leninism are alien to the Russian mind. He also provides perspective for current changes under Gorbachev. The possibility of Bukharin's rehabilitation, for instance, which seems now quite likely, was regarded by this lucid observer as "a sure sign that real and substantial changes have taken place in the essential nature of the Soviet system of rule." Leonard Schapiro is not here any more to enrich our understanding of the Soviet Union but his ideas remain with us, a testimony to his profound and cultivated historical vision.

USSR Foreign Policy After Détente. Revised Edition. By Richard F. Staar. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987. 308 pp. $13.95 (paper). Staar probes the Soviet use of détente to weaken the Western democracies and pursue a politics of relentless expansionism. Knowledgeable in the intricacies of Soviet doctrines concerning the correlation of forces, Staar debunks the notion that détente is the only rational approach in the nuclear age. He provides an impressive catalogue of the instrumentalities employed by Soviet Communists in their foreign policy, including propaganda, espionage and active measures, and military strategy. Those who nourish illusions about

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Soviet good faith or commitment to the cause of peace should have their beliefs shattered by this well-informed and clear-minded compendium. The style is matter-of-fact; the author lets the historical evidence build his thesis that the Soviets have created a network of organizations and institutions to support their international ambitions.

Unlike many analysts, Staar is persuaded that ideology remains the driving force of Soviet foreign policy. The mystical faith of Marxism-Leninism may have vanished, but its imperial impulse remains. So too remains the aptitude to manipulate Western public opinion and simulate interest in arms reductions. Recent Soviet inroads in the Third World, as well as Gorbachev's lack of enthusiasm for political reforms in Eastern Europe, bear out Staar's assumption that the foreign policy of the USSR is still guided by a dogma that remains messianic in its nature.

Vaclav Havel or Living in Truth. Edited by Jan Vladislav. London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987. 315 pp. $22.50. In six essays collected here, Czech playwright Vaclav Havel offers an ethics of resistance and a politics of conscience. Then the contributors — among them Milan Kundera, Samuel Beckett, Pavel Kohout, Tom Stoppard, Ludvik Vaculik, and Timothy Garton Ash — illustrate the impact of Havel's ideas.

Writing about contemporary Czechoslovakia, Havel dwells on the "the hideous spider whose invisible web runs right through the whole of society," i.e., the state police. He describes the moral collapse of communist regimes in which political life has been replaced by hollow ideological ritual. In response, Havel calls for a new politics that takes into account the "power of the powerless." Dissident movements are harbingers of social change that repudiate the cynical tenets of Realpolitik. Contradicting the official verbiage, they contribute to the emergence of parallel structures, creating a "second culture." According to Havel, "what else are parallel structures than an area where a different life can be lived, a life that is in harmony with its own aims and which in turn structures itself in harmony with those aims?"

To all who preach cowardly adjustment to the status quo, Havel proclaims the need to oppose injustice, and his courage to challenge the powers-that-be cost him more than four years in prison. Havel might have chosen to live abroad, in one of those Western countries where his plays are widely acclaimed. Instead, he keeps living and fighting in Prague, linking his fate to that of his nation. This may look like folly in a police state, but he has shown that this is the way not to despair. Havel's 1986 Erasmus Prize was thus more than well-deserved; accepting it, he reminded the "president of oblivion" (as

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Milan Kundera has called Gustav Husak) of the ineradicable rights of memory.

LATIN AMERICA
by Michael Radu

At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia. By E. Bradford Burns. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 211 pp. $6.95 (paper). The author's passionate hostility to any U.S. policy based on a perceived threat to regional stability from Managua is matched only by an indiscriminate, often misinformed apology for the Sandinistas. Burns asserts, for instance, that "For the first time in generations, Nicaragua stands on the threshold of becoming self-sufficient in food" — this at a time when the top Sandinista leaders repeatedly and publicly have admitted severe food shortages and when staples abundant before 1979 (beans, sugar, rice, meat) are rationed or nonexistent. The author having visited Nicaragua six times since 1981, only ideological blindness can explain his book's contents.

The Bear in the Back Yard. Moscow's Caribbean Strategy By Timothy Ashby. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987. 240 pp. $22.95. More realistic than most commentators on the question of Soviet bloc penetration of the Caribbean Basin, the author strongly believes in a great Soviet conspiracy in the region. His assertions about the Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan roles in countries like Guyana, Surinam, the Eastern Caribbean are excessive and unproven. A look into current Soviet literature and behavior in the area would suggest a far less coherent strategy, if any exists at all. On the other hand, Ashby makes welcome use of well known but neglected sources to reject the claims of a nationalist or democratic or nonaligned character of the Left in El Salvador, Grenada, and Nicaragua.

Central America and the Reagan Doctrine. Edited by Walter F. Hahn, Lanham, Md.: United States Strategic Institute, and London: University Press of America, 1987. 336 pp. $12.25 (paper). An introduction by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick sets the stage for this collection of essays reprinted from *Strategic Review*. In addition to Douglas Payne's well-known article of the Sandinista strategy of deception ("manto"), analyses by Ashley J. Teller on the geopolitical importance of Central America and by Senator Malcolm Wallop on the uses of covert action remain pertinent. The majority of articles, however, are clearly dated (some were written in 1984) — a natural pitfall of such readers. The

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biggest disappointment is William Bode's article on the Reagan Doctrine which, carried away by enthusiasm for the president's good intentions and sound instincts, fails to point out the "doctrine's" major problems: the inability to convince the American people and, perhaps more important, to provide consistency and coherence in practice.

The Central American Crisis Reader. Edited by Robert S. Leiken and Barry Rubin. New York: Summit Books, 1987. 717 pp. $12.95 (paper). A needed anthology of historical and political texts on Central America, this ambitious volume nonetheless includes some works of minor importance. A number of historical pieces could have been replaced by longer extracts from more significant ones, like Carlos Fonseca's "A Nicaraguan in Moscow," or "Last Testament." For the truly interested, this massive volume removes any excuse for ignorance and lack of data on this area vital to the security of the United States.

Conflict in Nicaragua, A Multidimensional Perspective. Edited by Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Dúran. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 440 pp. $39.95 ($14.95, paper). A conference anthology with important, useful, and handy primary sources, this large volume places Nicaragua in its regional and global contexts. If the chapters on Nicaragua's international position are neither original nor enlightening, those on domestic developments are significant contributions, especially Alvaro Taboada Terán's chapter on the legal system. Articles by Alfredo César, Arturo J. Cruz Porras, and Arturo J. Cruz Sequeira on the behavior and nature of the Managua regime are perhaps less important analytically than they are as documents for the student of Nicaraguan elites, particularly in their emigré disappointed version.

U.S. Policy and Regional Security in Central America. By Edward Best. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 182 pp. $32.50. A strong supporter of negotiations with the Sandinistas at any price, Best argues against U.S. support for the Contras because people die and confrontation with Managua continues. If the Sandinistas are moving into the orbit of Moscow and Havana, this is due to Washington's insensitivity to their "political needs." The author encourages a settlement with Managua, even at the cost of destroying the insurgents. Best lacks the necessary understanding of Latin, and particularly Central, American realities to write this book, and it shows.

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